


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CASE
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28TH
DIVISION
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
IN THE
WORLD WAR



PREPARED BY THE
AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
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Foreword

THE AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION was created by Congress in 1923 for the purpose of commemorating the services of American forces in Europe during the World War. In the accomplishment of this mission, the Commission has erected suitable memorials in Europe and improved and beautified the eight American cemeteries there. It has also published a book entitled "American Armies and Battlefields in Europe" which gives a concise account of the vital part played by American forces in the World War and detailed information regarding the memorials and cemeteries.

In order that the actions of American troops might be accurately set forth, detailed studies were made of the operations of each division which had front-line battle service. In certain cases studies of sector service were also prepared. It is felt that the results of this research should now be made available to the public. Therefore, these studies are being published in a series of twenty-eight booklets, each booklet devoted to the operations of one division.

In these booklets only the active service of the divisions is treated in detail. The accounts, however, are comprehensive enough to be of general interest and establish a great body of fact concerning the operations. For the military student, they provide an excellent background for tactical studies and present an extensive list of sources upon which further study can be based.

AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION


CHAIRMAN

M221924

PREFACE

IN READING the booklets of this series it should be borne in mind that they are based on historical studies which were prepared by the American Battle Monuments Commission primarily for the purpose of determining the front line of each American division for each day of its active operations. Consequently, they were essentially front-line infantry studies. The operations of other arms, movements of reserves and other phases of the operations were covered only in sufficient detail to afford a complete understanding of the infantry action.

The preparation of these studies was begun soon after the Commission was created, and every precaution was taken to insure that the research would be conducted with the utmost accuracy and thoroughness. A number of officers from the Regular Army as well as from the Marine Corps were selected and detailed to the Commission from time to time to carry on the work. All records of the War Department pertaining to the subject were exhaustively examined, as were the French, British and German documents which had been collected by the Army War College. From these sources, the daily front lines of each division were determined and plotted on large-scale maps, and brief accounts of the operations were prepared. The maps and accounts of operations were then referred to officers of the divisions concerned for comment and additional information. They were normally sent to officers of all ranks down to and including company commanders. In cases of doubtful or controversial points, the reference was carried further. The replies received were carefully studied, evaluated and used to correct and amplify the original studies. In this way, the Commission was able to secure and preserve valuable data which otherwise would have been lost.

In these booklets, it has not been the purpose to go far beyond the scope of the original studies. However, casualty and strength tables have been added and enough other material

has been included to present connected histories of the divisions from their organization until the conclusion of their service in Europe, and to portray their actions in proper relationship to the operations of the corps and armies with which they served.

In order to indicate to the reader the areas in which the divisions served, a general map of France and Belgium has been included in each booklet. This map shows the principal cities and the battle lines of July 17 and November 11. In addition, it shows, by special symbol, certain localities of particular interest to the division concerned.

All dates are 1918 unless otherwise indicated and are inclusive; for example, October 9-11 includes the three days, October 9, 10 and 11. Dates in the headings of chapters dealing with operations, and in the titles of accompanying maps, are in general the dates between which one or more infantry regiments of the division have been awarded battle honors by the War Department. In certain cases infantry regiments, as well as other elements of the division, have been awarded battle honors for dates other than those indicated. The dates on the battle lines of the maps include the period during which the division held command. The lines are as of midnight unless otherwise indicated; for example, October 9 indicates the line held at midnight, October 9.

The operation maps are reproductions of maps commonly used by American forces during the World War. In a great number of cases it was necessary to use parts of two or more sheets of the wartime maps to make one operation map, which accounts for the different treatments of topographical detail often found on the same operation map. Names which appear on the maps in the abbreviated form are spelled in full in the text. A table of abbreviations with the French equivalent and English translation appears in the front of each booklet. Names of certain topographical features which are well known, and are frequently referred to, appear in the text in the Anglicized form; for example, Argonne Forest rather than Forêt d'Argonne, Marne River rather than Marne Rivière.

The casualty figures are based on the official casualty records of The Adjutant General. Tables of casualties have been prepared, however, only for the periods of active operations. The

purpose is to show the casualties which occurred under the division command during specific actions. Therefore, casualties of elements which were detached during the actions are not included, while casualties of elements of other divisions which were attached have been included. It will be noted that, in the majority of cases, the dates in the casualty tables cover longer periods than those in the chapter headings or on the maps. This was found necessary in order to include all casualties incident to entering or leaving the line.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- A. E. F.—American Expeditionary Forces
B. (Bois)—wood
Barrge. (Barrage)—dam
Boy. (Boyau)—communicating trench
Chau. (Château)—chateau
Carrf. (Carrefour)—crossroads
excl.—exclusive
Fme. (Ferme)—farm
Grd., Gde., Gds. (Grand, Grande, Grands)—large
G. H. Q.—General Headquarters
Hts. (Hauts)—high
incl.—inclusive
Min. (Moulin)—mill
Natle. (Nationale)—national
Pte. (Petite)—small
Rau. (Ruisseau)—brook
Rte. (Route)—highway
Ston. (Station)—station
Tr. (Tranchée)—trench
Use. (Usine)—factory

Organization, and Service from Arrival in the A. E. F. until June 27

THE 28TH DIVISION was organized in August 1917 from National Guard units of the State of Pennsylvania. In March 1918 the division was brought to full strength by the assignment of selective service men from Camps Lee, Virginia; Meade, Maryland; and Travis, Texas. In April it moved to Camp Upton, New York, preparatory to embarking for France. [1]¹

The principal units of the division were:

<i>55th Infantry Brigade</i>	<i>56th Infantry Brigade</i>
109th Infantry Regiment	111th Infantry Regiment
110th Infantry Regiment	112th Infantry Regiment
108th Machine-Gun Battalion	109th Machine-Gun Battalion

53d Field Artillery Brigade


107th Field Artillery Regiment (75-mm guns)	109th Field Artillery Regiment (75-mm guns)
108th Field Artillery Regiment (155-mm howitzers)	103d Trench-Mortar Battery

Divisional Troops

107th Machine-Gun Battalion	103d Engineer Regiment
103d Field Signal Battalion	Headquarters Troop
Trains	[1]

The details of organization of the American infantry division were changed from time to time during the World War. Under the tables of organization which were in use in the American

¹ The figures in brackets at the ends of paragraphs refer to the sources on which the statements in the paragraphs are based. All sources are listed in the appendix (p. 89).





Expeditionary Forces on November 11, 1918, and which, in general, were in force during 1918, the maximum authorized strength of the division was 991 officers and 27,114 men. Its principal armament was 24 155-mm howitzers, 48 75-mm guns, 12 6-inch trench mortars, 260 machine guns and 16,193 rifles. Further details concerning the composition of the American infantry division appear in the table on page 87. The divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces seldom attained the maximum authorized strength shown above. The actual strength of the 28th Division on certain dates is shown in the table on page 88. The approximate strength of the division for other dates may be obtained by applying to these figures the battle losses which appear in the casualty tables following the accounts of battle operations. [2]

From May 3 to 7 division headquarters and the infantry units sailed from Hoboken, followed during May by the artillery brigade and the remainder of the division. The units landed at Liverpool and Southampton, England, and after a brief stay in rest camps, proceeded to France, landing at Calais and Le Havre. [1, 234]

Following its arrival in France, the 28th Division, less artillery, proceeded on May 17 to the Lumbres training area, east of Boulogne, where it was attached to the British 34th Division, British Second Army, for training. On June 7 the artillery brigade moved to Camp de Meucon for training. It did not rejoin the division until August. On June 12 the division moved to the area of the French Tenth Army, northeast of Paris. [1, 3]

Château-Thierry Sector, Champagne-Marne Defensive, Aisne-Marne Offensive, Fismes Sector and Oise-Aisne Offensive

CHÂTEAU-THIERRY SECTOR, JUNE 28-JULY 14

CHAMPAGNE-MARNE DEFENSIVE, JULY 15-18

AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE, JULY 18-AUGUST 6

FISMES SECTOR, AUGUST 7-17

OISE-AISNE OFFENSIVE, AUGUST 18-SEPTEMBER 7

ON MARCH 21 the Germans launched the first of their great offensives by which they hoped to win the war before the American army could take the field in force. This attack drove a deep salient into the Allied lines at the junction of the British and French armies and seriously threatened the important railroad center of Amiens. The lines in the vicinity of Amiens had scarcely stabilized when, on April 9, the Germans launched a second offensive farther north. This attack drove a salient into the British lines along the Lys River, in the vicinity of Armentières. [3]

Another of these blows was directed against the French, when, on May 27, the Germans attacked between Berry-aubac, approximately 17 kilometers northwest of Reims, and the Oise River. The attack came as a complete surprise. The Germans broke through the French lines, crossed the Aisne, Vesle and Ourcq Rivers, and drove rapidly to the Marne. Upon reaching the Marne River, they used that stream to protect their southern flank, and turned westward toward Paris. At

the conclusion of this offensive the Germans had driven a salient into the Allied lines, bounded roughly by Reims, Château-Thierry and Soissons. [3,237]

While these German offensives failed to accomplish their purpose, they strained the Allies to the limit of their reserves and made it necessary to send American divisions to different parts of the front for immediate service with the British and French armies. [3,237]



The following paragraphs, in *italic*, are a synopsis of the service of the 28th Division in the Château-Thierry Sector, Champagne-Marne Defensive, Aisne-Marne Offensive, Fismes Sector and the Oise-Aisne Offensive. This synopsis is designed to make the principal facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact form.

Elements of the 28th Division served during June and July with American and French divisions in the vicinity of Château-Thierry. The 55th Infantry Brigade was attached to the French 125th Division, and occupied a secondary position from the center of Bois de Rougis to a point north of Coufremaux. Four companies held front-line positions on the south bank of the Marne River.

At the start of the Champagne-Marne Defensive on July 15, the detachments along the Marne were surrounded, but fought their way to the rear. Part of the second position held by the 55th Infantry Brigade became the front line and the troops holding it stopped the enemy's advance. Detachments assisted the French 73d and 20th Divisions in counterattacks on July 16 and 17, and held the second line from July 18 to 22 while the French followed up the German withdrawal from the territory south of the Marne.

The 56th Infantry Brigade was attached to the French 39th Division, XXXVIII Corps, and occupied the second position south of Château-Thierry. Detachments participated in attacks against Hill 204 with the French 39th Division on July 1 and 6. During the German attack, the positions of the brigade were subjected to artillery fire. From July 18 to 22 the brigade was in

reserve positions. On July 22 it was transferred to the American I Corps and attached to the American 26th Division, with which it continued operations in the Aisne-Marne Offensive.

On the night of July 27-28 the 28th Division relieved the French 39th Division on a line extending from Courmont to La Gense. It attacked on the 28th and crossed the Ourcq River. Slight gains were made on the 29th. On July 30 Bois des Grimpettes and Cote 188 were captured. The 28th Division was relieved during the night of July 30-31 by the 32d Division.

On August 3 the 28th Division was in rear of the 32d Division ready to execute a passage of lines when the latter should have established a bridgehead north of the Vesle River. This was not accomplished, and the 28th Division relieved the 32d Division along the Vesle in and southwest of Fismes during the night of August 6-7.

Elements of the division crossed the Vesle near Le Grand Savar, to the left of the sector, on August 7, and on August 8 the line was established in Fismette. On August 10 Château du Diable was captured.

In the reorganization of the French Sixth Army on August 13, the 28th Division shifted to the east, relieving the French 164th Division and turning over that part of its sector west of Fismes to the American 77th Division.

In the early days of the Oise-Aisne Offensive, which began on August 18, there was little activity on the front of the 28th Division. On August 22 Fismette was cleared of the enemy, but he recaptured the town on August 27. Efforts to clean out the enemy south of the river to the east of Fismes were unsuccessful.

As a result of Allied attacks to the northwest, the Germans executed a withdrawal in front of the French Sixth Army during the night of September 3-4.

The division attacked on the afternoon of September 4, crossed the Vesle River and established a line on the southern edge of the plateau between the Vesle and Aisne Rivers. On September 5 the left of the division advanced on the plateau about 1 kilometer. A general attack on the afternoon of September 6 resulted in a gain of about 500 meters.

The 28th Division was relieved on this line during the night of September 7-8 by the French 62d Division.

When the Germans launched their offensive against the French, on May 27, the 28th Division was training with the British. Owing to the depleted condition of French reserves after the conclusion of this offensive, the 28th and four other American divisions were moved from the British to the French front early in June. The 28th Division was stationed in the vicinity of Gonesse, northeast of Paris, where the 55th Infantry Brigade was attached to the French 125th Division, and the 56th Infantry Brigade to the French 39th Division, both of the French Tenth Army. Training was resumed. On June 22 these French divisions, together with the attached 28th Division, were placed at the disposal of the French XXXVIII Corps, French Sixth Army. [3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9]

*June 28-
July 14*

On June 28 the French 39th and 125th Divisions took over portions of the front line in the Château-Thierry Sector on the south face of the Marne salient. The French 125th Division went into line along the south bank of the Marne River about 10 kilometers east of Château-Thierry (Map No. 1). The line taken over by the French 39th Division lay on both banks of the river from a point opposite the east edge of Château-Thierry to a point 3 kilometers west of the town (Map No. 2). At first the brigades of the 28th Division were held in reserve. [8, 10, 11, 12]

The 55th Infantry Brigade continued its training behind the lines until July 1 when it occupied the second line of defense in the sector of the French 125th Division. This position extended west from the center of Bois de Rougis for about 6 kilometers to a point north of Coufremaux. It was held with the 109th and 110th Infantry Regiments in line from right to left. The front line in this sector was about 5 kilometers to the north along the Marne River. The sector to the right was held by the French 51st Division, French III Corps, and that to the left by the American 3d Division, French XXXVIII Corps. [13, 14, 15, 16]

On July 8 the French III Corps took command of that part of the sector of the XXXVIII Corps occupied by the French 125th Division and the 55th Infantry Brigade. [17]

On July 9 Company M, 109th Infantry, and Companies B and C, 110th Infantry, were attached to the French 113th Infantry. They were placed in the front line along the Marne River, from right to left, as follows: Company M, northeast of Courthiézy, Company C, east of Sauvigny and Company B, west of Sauvigny. On July 11 Company L, 109th Infantry, was attached to the French 131st Infantry and placed in the front line along the Marne north of Varennes. These companies were interspersed with French units and had elements in the outpost line along the river and on the high ground to the south. [16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]

The mission of the outposts was to prevent the deployment of enemy troops which might cross the river. They were to fight to the end, even though surrounded. The line of resistance was to be held at all costs. [20]

The 56th Infantry Brigade continued its training behind the lines from June 28 to July 1. It was then assigned to the second line of defense in the sector of the French 39th Division. This line was occupied from July 1 to 14 with minor adjustments. It extended from La Trinité Ferme, 3 kilometers south of Nesles, to Bois de Gravilles, 5 kilometers south of Beaurepaire Ferme. [14, 24, 25]

Platoons and companies of the 111th and 112th Infantry Regiments received front-line training with the French 39th Division in the vicinity of Hill 204. Elements of these regiments participated in two local attacks on Hill 204 by the French 153d Infantry. [23, 26]

On July 1 a battalion of the French 153d Infantry, with a platoon from Company A and one from Company B, 111th Infantry, attacked Hill 204, while the American 2d Division attacked Vaux. Advances were made on both sides of the hill, but a German counterattack drove the force on the west slope back to its line of departure. [23, 27, 28, 29, 54]

On July 6 a mixed force composed of French units, the trench-mortar platoons of the 111th and 112th Infantry Regi-

ments, and two rifle sections of the 112th Infantry, succeeded in capturing Bois de Courteau east of the hill. [23, 30, 31, 32, 33]

During the night of July 8-9 the Germans recaptured Bois de Courteau in an attack that involved platoons from Companies L and M, 111th Infantry, and Companies G and I, 112th Infantry. [23, 34, 35, 36, 37]

The German troops in the Marne salient were in an unfavorable situation. Their only rail communication was the railroad through Soissons, which lay close to the west face of the salient, and would be cut by an Allied penetration in this area. On June 9 the Germans had made an unsuccessful attempt to widen the salient to the west and bring their lines closer to Paris by attacking between Montdidier and Noyon, about 35 kilometers northwest of Soissons. After the failure of the Montdidier-Noyon Offensive, they made plans to improve their situation by widening the salient to the east. One attack was to be launched east of Reims in the direction of Châlons-sur-Marne, east of Epernay, and one southwest of Reims in the direction of Epernay. These converging attacks, if successful, would turn the Allied positions about Reims on both flanks. Thus the Germans would gain dominating positions south of Reims and the important railroad communications through the city itself. It was also anticipated that the French troops defending Paris might be separated from those in the vicinity of Verdun. [3, 5, 272]

By this time, however, a sufficient number of American troops had arrived in France to permit the Allies to assume the offensive. Plans for an Allied and American attack against the Marne salient were therefore prepared. These plans were designed to take advantage of the faulty enemy communications. The French Tenth Army was to deliver the main attack. It was to drive eastward south of Soissons and cut the German communications through that place. In conjunction with this attack, the French Fifth Army was to attack the east face of the salient. Between these armies, the French Sixth Army was to apply pressure at the tip of the salient and support with its left the main attack of the French Tenth

Army. It was contemplated that a number of American divisions would be used in this offensive. [3, 5, 41, 42]

While preparations for this Allied and American offensive were being made, the German plans for their attacks east and southwest of Reims were discovered. The decision by the Germans to attack at these points was fortunate for their opponents, since it allowed the Allied and American attack, already planned, to be delivered as a counterstroke. Preparations were therefore made to meet the German attacks, and launch the counterattack as soon as the Germans had been definitely checked. The French were able to secure very accurate information concerning the German plans. By July 7 they had learned that the offensive would involve the French Fourth Army in the Champagne east of Reims, and the French Fifth and Sixth Armies southwest of the city. On July 11 they were able to establish the approximate date upon which the offensive would be launched. The action against this German offensive is known as the Champagne-Marne Defensive. The counteroffensive against the Germans in the Marne salient is known as the Aisne-Marne Offensive. [3, 5, 38, 39, 40, 419]

In the sector of the French 125th Division, the German plan of attack provided that river crossings would be made at Tré-
loup, Courcelles, Passy-sur-Marne and Jaulgonne. Their objective, in this sector, was a line about 7 kilometers south of the Marne River, passing through Celles-les-Condé. [43, 44]

The offensive was to open with a heavy bombardment commencing at 12:10 a. m., July 15. At 1:50 a. m. the construction of bridges was to begin. The infantry was to cross as soon as possible and advance behind a rolling barrage, which was to start from the railroad at 3:50 a. m. [45, 46]

The time of the impending attack was learned from prisoners captured by the French Fourth Army early in the evening of July 14. This information was distributed to all concerned in time for the Allied artillery to open fire by midnight, July 14, ten minutes before the German artillery fire was to begin. [5]

The German offensive was launched on July 15 as planned. River crossings were successfully made in the sector of the French 125th Division. When the power of the German attack

July 15

developed shortly after daybreak, the French fell back, leaving the four American companies, B and C, 110th Infantry, and L and M, 109th Infantry, on the riverbank. Although surrounded, these companies maintained their positions until about 8 a. m., when they began to fight their way to the south to regain the French lines. The survivors reached the new lines during the afternoon. [16, 22, 23, 47, 48, 49]

Meanwhile the German attack made rapid progress and by 2:45 p. m. had reached the line, La Chapelle-Monthodon—St. Agnan—point 223—Grange aux Bois—east edge of the clearing at Janvier Ferme—Hill 231. The French second position at Bois de Rougis, consisting of two lines of trenches, one about 300 meters north of the wood and the other along the edge of the wood, manned by the American 109th Infantry, thus became a front line. [47, 51, 52, 53]

The 109th Infantry first observed German troops across the valley about 9 a. m., but did not fire on them because French and American troops to the front were still retiring. However, German attempts to cross the valley during the afternoon were prevented by fire from this position. To the northwest, a thin line was established by the reserves of the French 125th Division extending from about 500 meters northwest of Dannejeu Ferme to Les Etangs Ferme. Companies H and D, 109th Infantry, held the right of this line northwest of Dannejeu Ferme. This line became engaged when the Germans succeeded in infiltrating to the western edge of Bois de Condé. [23, 52, 55, 56, 68, 69]

At 8 a. m. the French 73d Division was assigned to the French XXXVIII Corps, and at noon was ordered to assist the French 125th Division by making a counterattack from the Surmelin valley to the northeast with the line, Les Coqs—Courthiézy—Sauvigny—Reuilly, as the objective. [57, 58]

This counterattack was launched at 7:30 p. m. The right regiment advanced from the heights north of Celles-les-Condé and occupied Sacconay. The left regiment attacked northeast in the direction of Janvier Ferme and succeeded in stopping

the German advance along the general line held by the division reserves. [58]

To the right of the sector of the French 125th Division, the French 51st Division had been driven back, but the enemy was stopped at the second position by the French 20th Division. A gap existed between the French 20th Division at Clairefontaine and the American 55th Infantry Brigade in Bois de Rougis. This was partially closed by the entry into line of Company K, 109th Infantry, during the afternoon. [16, 59]

To the left, the American 3d Division stopped the enemy advance, but refused its right flank because of the hostile advance in the sector of the French 125th Division. Remnants of the French division joined the 3d Division in forming a line in the vicinity of Les Etangs Ferme. [55, 60]

Meanwhile, on a 40-kilometer front of attack in Champagne, the enemy met with only slight success and the line of the French Fourth Army remained intact. West of Reims, on the front of the French Fifth and Sixth Armies, the Germans pushed back the French and Italian divisions for 8 kilometers and were successful except where opposed by Americans. [5]

The enemy ordered a continuation of the attack on July 16. His right wing was to obtain full possession of Bois de Condé and establish outposts along Le Surmelin Ruisseau. [61, 62]

The Sixth Army ordered a counterattack for July 16 by five French divisions operating under the French III Corps. The former line on the Marne River was the objective. Two of the divisions were en route, so the corps ordered the attack made on a 20-kilometer front by three divisions plus a mixed detachment consisting of one battalion of the American 55th Infantry Brigade and a regiment from the French 20th Division under the command of the latter. The order of battle prescribed for the counterattack was:

FRENCH III CORPS

French	Franco-American	French	French
73d Division	Detachment	18th Division	77th Division
			[63, 64]

The 55th Infantry Brigade ordered the 1st Battalion and Company K, 109th Infantry, to make the counterattack. This battalion was to turn over its position on the northern slope of Bois de Rougis to the 1st Battalion, 103d Engineers. After forming for the attack under cover of the wood in the order, Companies K, C, B and A, from right to left, the battalion was to pass through the 103d Engineers at H-hour. [23, 52]

July 16 After some delay the attack of the Franco-American detachment was launched about 12:30 p. m., July 16. On the right, the French succeeded in reaching La Bourdonnerie Ferme, 2 kilometers to the north, but late in the afternoon lost the farm as the result of a German counterattack. Chézy and Montlecon were captured and held. On the left, the 1st Battalion, 109th Infantry, attacked the high ground marked by point 200 with little success and heavy losses. After advancing about 300 meters, it retired through the line of the 103d Engineers to the cover of Bois de Rougis. A second American attack delivered about 6 p. m. was likewise unsuccessful. The battalion was then withdrawn and grouped in Bois de Rougis as reserve of the 1st Battalion, 103d Engineers. [23, 52, 65, 66]

To the west, the French 73d Division attacked at the same time as the 109th Infantry and during the afternoon captured St. Agnan, point 223, and most of the clearing at Janvier Ferme. The enemy retook St. Agnan at 7 p. m., but again lost it to the French at midnight. About 2 p. m. Company H, 109th Infantry, joined in the attack of the 73d Division and advanced northeast into Bois de Condé for several hundred meters. Company D, 109th Infantry, moved up in support of Company H. [23, 67, 68, 69]

During the day further attempts by the enemy to break through the French Fourth Army served to reveal the extent of the German defeat. All German offensive action there was stopped. West of Reims the German attack gained ground along the Marne toward Epernay, but progress was so costly that efforts to advance south of the river were discontinued. For July 17 the attack was to continue north of the Marne only, against the French Fifth Army. [70]

Encouraged by the successful resistance offered to the Ger-

man attack, the Allies continued their preparations for the counteroffensive against the west face of the Marne salient. In order to enable the Sixth Army to concentrate on this phase of the battle, the French Ninth Army was ordered to take tactical control of that part of the Sixth Army on the south bank of the Marne. The mission of the Ninth Army was to stop further enemy progress and drive him back across the Marne. [5, 71]

The French III Corps ordered the counterattack continued on July 17 without change in mission. The remnants of the French 51st and 125th Divisions were to be withdrawn from the lines and command in the corps sector readjusted accordingly. The boundary between the French 20th and 73d Divisions, which was to be effective at midnight, July 16, was the line, Sacconay—les Lenards Ferme. Each division was to take command of all troops in its sector. Thus the 55th Infantry Brigade was divided between these French divisions. [72]

The French Ninth Army took command of the French III *July 17* Corps at 8 a.m., July 17. [73]

Elements of the French 20th Division passed through the lines of the 1st Battalion, 103d Engineers, attacked the high ground marked by point 200, and established a line on the north side of the brook, about 200 meters south of the edge of the woods. The line of the American engineers thus became a secondary position. [23, 74]

At 9 a. m., while units of the French 73d Division were reorganizing in the ravine northwest of Sacconay preparatory to attacking, they were attacked by the enemy and driven from point 223 and out of the southeastern part of Bois de Condé. A French counterattack made shortly thereafter restored the situation, and by 5 p. m. the line of the previous day was again occupied. [67]

The German attack struck Companies D and H, 109th Infantry, while they were eating breakfast and threw them into confusion. They were re-formed in the trenches held on the night of July 15-16 and joined the French in the fighting that resulted in regaining the line of the night of July 16-17. [23, 68, 69]

The 56th Infantry Brigade, in the second position in the sector of the French 39th Division, was under artillery fire from July 15 to 17. Elements of the 111th Infantry were attached to the American 3d Division as follows: the 2d Battalion on July 15, the 1st Battalion on July 16 and the remainder of the regiment on July 18. Elements of the 112th Infantry took over the position vacated by the 111th Infantry. During the night of July 17-18 the 112th Infantry moved to an area south of Courboin (Map No. 1). [50, 75]

The great German offensive begun on July 15 was spent by the 17th, the effort having resulted in only small gains southwest of Reims. [76]

The Allies made their final preparations on the 17th for the counteroffensive set for July 18. This counteroffensive was to be launched by the French Tenth and Sixth Armies on the west face of the Marne salient. The French Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Armies were to assist by attacks, the objectives of which were the recovery of the ground lost since July 15. The artillery preparation for the Fourth Army was to start at 4 a.m., July 18, and for the Fifth and Ninth Armies at 5 a.m. [77]

Announcing that its missions were to hold the line reached and to prepare a new attack that would force the enemy north of the Marne, the III Corps began to reorganize its sector during the night of July 17-18. The French 4th Division relieved the French 20th Division, and all elements of the 55th Infantry Brigade were attached to the French 73d Division. The boundary between the two French divisions became the line, Evry (excl.)—St. Agnan (incl.)—les Lenards Ferme. A new second position was established, which, in the sector of the 73d Division, extended from Les Glapieds to Condé-en-Brie and thence west along the old position. The American 55th Infantry Brigade was to hold this position. [78]

July
18-22 At 4:35 a. m., July 18, the French Sixth and Tenth Armies began the counteroffensive against the Marne salient. The attack took the enemy by surprise, and penetrated his lines between Soissons and Château-Thierry to the extent that his main artery of communication was seriously endangered. The

German High Command at once ordered a retirement to the north bank of the Marne on the front of the French Ninth Army. The movement was to take place during the night of July 19-20. On July 19 the enemy decided to evacuate the Marne salient by a progressive withdrawal. [79, 80]

Aside from the artillery fire commencing at 5 a. m., there was no offensive activity by the Ninth Army on July 18. During the late afternoon and evening, in the zone of the 55th Infantry Brigade, the 1st Battalion, 103d Engineers, moved back to La Fourche Ferme, east of Grande Fontaine, and the 109th Infantry assembled in the woods north of Romandie. The 110th Infantry remained in the second position near Condé-en-Brie. [23, 68, 69, 81, 82, 83, 84]

There was no change in the location or mission of the 55th Infantry Brigade between July 19 and 21, although the French 73d Division moved back to the Marne on July 20. The French crossed the river on July 22, and the 55th Infantry Brigade was transferred to the XXXVIII Corps. [58, 84, 85]

There was no change in the location of units of the 56th Infantry Brigade on July 18 and 19. During the night of July 20-21 the 112th Infantry moved to the woods north of Charly, about 10 kilometers southwest of Château-Thierry, and the 111th Infantry rejoined the brigade at Les Grands Bordeaux (Map No. 1). On July 21 the 111th Infantry moved to north of Château-Thierry, and the 112th Infantry to the woods north of Bresles. On July 22 the 56th Infantry Brigade was transferred to the American I Corps and placed at the disposal of the American 26th Division, with which it continued its operations in the Aisne-Marne Offensive. [85, 86, 87]

In the afternoon of July 23 the 55th Infantry Brigade began to move to the area, Saulchery—Charly—Bois au Nord, about 10 kilometers southwest of Château-Thierry. During the night of July 26-27 it moved to the Marne between Mézy and Château-Thierry (Maps 1 and 2) with the mission of guarding the river crossings. The 56th Infantry Brigade was in reserve of the American I Corps, north of Château-Thierry, while the artillery brigade was still in training. [88, 89, 90, 91]

July
23-27

At 8:35 p. m., July 26, the French Sixth Army had ordered an attack to be launched on the following day at 9:40 p. m. by the French XXXVIII Corps and American I Corps with the object of capturing the heights north of the Ourcq River and exploiting beyond. [92]

At 11:50 p. m. the 28th Division was ordered to make this attack by passing the 55th Infantry Brigade, in two regimental columns, through the position of the American 3d and French 39th Divisions. These columns were to advance to the line of hills north of the Ourcq. During darkness, the bayonet only was to be used. [93, 94, 95]

During the night of July 26–27 the enemy withdrew to the Ourcq River. On the morning of the 27th, when this retirement was discovered, the American 3d and French 39th Divisions took up the pursuit. At 9:30 a. m. the French XXXVIII Corps postponed the attack planned for the night of July 27–28, and directed the 28th Division to relieve the French 39th Division. [96, 97, 98]

The 28th Division promptly notified the 55th Infantry Brigade that the night operation was suspended, but cautioned it to be ready to attack and directed it to follow the French at about 4 kilometers and keep advised of the situation of the front line. In the afternoon the division ordered the brigade to relieve the French 39th Division at nightfall and to take up the pursuit as soon as possible after the completion of the relief. The French light artillery already in the area was to remain in line and support the 28th Division, while the French engineers and signal troops were to be relieved by the 103d Engineers and 103d Field Signal Battalion, respectively. In the event that the French were stopped on the Ourcq, the 110th Infantry was to take over the front with one battalion and place its remaining battalions side by side on a line south of Courmont—Fresnes. The 109th Infantry was to be echeloned to the left rear. [99, 100]

The zone of action assigned to the 28th Division was as follows:

Right boundary: Courmont (incl.)—Cierges (excl.).

Left boundary: Balanchères (excl.)—la Motte Ferme (incl.)—Sergy (excl.).

The American 3d Division, French XXXVIII Corps, was to the right of this zone and the American 42d Division, American I Corps, to the left. [97, 101]

In the course of the afternoon and evening of July 27 the French 39th Division occupied Courmont and Fresnes and its cavalry patrols reached the Ourcq River. [97]

Pursuant to orders of the Sixth Army, the XXXVIII Corps, at 7:15 p. m., directed the execution of the attack order issued on the previous day. The advance was to commence at 11 p. m., July 27, preceded by a 10-minute artillery preparation. This order was received by the 28th Division while it was in the process of relieving the French 39th Division. In addition to the rapidly changing situation, rainy weather and a heavy fog hampered the entry into line, and the relief was not completed in time to make the attack at the designated hour. Meanwhile, the Sixth Army and the XXXVIII Corps ordered the troops to continue the pursuit without delay in case the Germans did not make a stand on the line of the Ourcq. [16, 23, 102, 103, 105]

The 56th Infantry Brigade, 28th Division, was returned to the XXXVIII Corps, placed in corps reserve, and ordered to take up a position in the large wood southeast of La Croix Rouge Ferme. [106]

The relief of the French continued during the night of July 27-28, and shortly after daybreak, July 28, the 28th Division *July 28* was deployed on a 2½ kilometer front extending from Courmont to La Cense in the following formation:

55TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

3d Battalion, 110th Infantry	2d Battalion, 110th Infantry
1st Battalion, 110th Infantry	
2d Battalion, 109th Infantry	3d Battalion, 109th Infantry
1st Battalion, 109th Infantry	

Companies of the 108th Machine-Gun Battalion supported each front-line battalion, and a battalion of the 103d Engineers was attached to each infantry regiment. [23, 107, 108, 109, 110]

Shortly after the completion of the relief, the 110th Infantry attacked without artillery support in a northeasterly direction.

Progress down the exposed slopes leading to the Ourcq River was slowed down by machine-gun and intermittent artillery fire. It was soon found that the left half of the zone of action was already occupied by troops of the 42d Division, which had attacked earlier in the morning. To avoid confusion, the left battalion veered to the east. By noon, both battalions had reached the Ourcq, in the right half of the divisional zone, where they were stopped by machine-gun fire from Bois des Grimpettes, in the zone of action of the 3d Division. [23, 53, 107, 111, 112]

Cover from this fire was obtained in the bed of the river, which was about 20 feet wide, with steep banks 6 or 7 feet high. At that time it was only partially filled with water, the stream being about 6 feet wide and a foot deep. [23, 113]

By 10:30 a. m. it was evident to the XXXVIII Corps that the Germans intended to defend the line of the Ourcq. It therefore ordered an attack by the American 3d and 28th Divisions with the high ground in Bois des Grimpettes as the objective. The main attack was to be made by the 3d Division, while the 28th Division was to take advantage of gains by the former and capture that part of the hill defined by Cierges, Moulin Caranda, and the Cierges—Courmont road. [114]

The operation was unsuccessful. Despite the fact that the 3d Division advanced only a few hundred meters north of Ronchères, the 28th Division attacked at 4:30 p. m., crossed the Ourcq and started up the open slopes beyond. With meagre artillery support, the troops made some progress but heavy machine-gun fire forced them to return to the defiladed ground near the river bed. A position was organized there for the night, with no front-line contact with troops to either flank. [23, 107, 115]

Throughout the hot summer day, the divisional area was subjected to artillery fire. A shell struck the headquarters of the 110th Infantry at Fresnes, inflicting casualties. [23, 111]

July 29 Acting on army and corps instructions, the 28th Division ordered the attack continued at 3:40 a. m., July 29, following a 10-minute artillery preparation. Troops were to attack in conjunction with those of the 3d Division, with Cote 220, east

of Sergy, as the first objective. The final objective was the line, Chéry-Chartreuve—Bruys, 12 kilometers to the north. Advance guards were to push forward to Mont St. Martin, 4 kilometers beyond the final objective. [116, 117, 118]

Owing to late reception of orders, the attack began at 4:45 a. m. with the 2d and 3d Battalions, 110th Infantry, still leading. Heavy fire stopped the advance temporarily at 6 a. m. about 600 meters beyond the Ourcq. Resistance from the vicinity of Bois des Grimpettes drew the 2d Battalion into the zone of action of the 3d Division, which was held up in Les 18 Arpents ravine. By 9:15 a. m. the assault wave had reached the edge of Bois des Grimpettes and the crest of Cote 188, west of the woods. This position was held for a short time in the face of heavy fire, but as casualties mounted the troops retired to the lower slopes of Cote 188 for protection. [23, 53, 119]

The 55th Infantry Brigade was directed to attack again at 3 p. m. in conjunction with the 3d Division. The 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, was to pass through the 3d Battalion and make the main attack. The 2d Battalion, 110th Infantry, on the right, was to support the 3d Division. One machine-gun company was to cover the advance with a barrage. [120]

The French artillery supporting the 28th Division fired a brief preparation on Cote 188, within the divisional boundaries. An offer to bombard Bois des Grimpettes, fire from which was holding up the advance of the 28th Division, was declined by the 3d Division. [113]

The 3d Division, which was about to be relieved, did not attack. The 28th Division attacked at 5 p. m. The 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, moved forward to the vicinity of the Ourcq but did not enter the fight. The 3d Battalion made little progress and soon Companies L and M, 109th Infantry, crossed the Ourcq to cover the reorganization of this battalion in a position on the south slope of Cote 188. [23, 53, 120, 121, 122]

The remainder of the 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, which had been ordered to follow the 110th Infantry at 500 yards, advanced toward the river from Cour-

mont and Fresnes and suffered considerably from shellfire. [23, 120]

When the 28th Division advanced to Cote 188 during the morning it lost liaison with the 3d Division. Efforts to regain front-line contact during the day were unsuccessful, but early the next morning the division established contact with the left of the American 32d Division, which had relieved the 3d Division during the night. Contact was maintained with the 42d Division southeast of Moulin Caranda. [23, 123]

On the night of July 29 the XXXVIII Corps ordered the attack continued the next morning with the same objectives as for the attack of the 29th. At the same time it directed the relief of the 28th Division by the 32d Division during the night of July 30-31. [124, 125, 126]

July
30-31

In compliance with the corps order, the 28th Division at 2:35 a. m., July 30, ordered the 55th Infantry Brigade to attack at 3:40 a. m. in conjunction with the 32d Division to the right. The artillery preparation was to be brief but heavy. The brigade made no change in its front-line dispositions, but the 109th Infantry was moved back to the area south of Courmont and Fresnes to avoid shellfire. [121, 127, 128, 129]

The attack was made by the 2d and 3d Battalions, 110th Infantry, and started on time with good artillery support. The 2d Battalion entered Bois des Grimpettes in the zone of action of the 32d Division. The 3d Battalion gained the crest of Cote 188 by 5:45 a. m. Under heavy machine-gun fire from Bois de Cierges to the east, as well as from Bois des Grimpettes, the 2d Battalion fell back to the unimproved road about 200 meters south of the wood. The 3d Battalion endeavored to outflank Bois des Grimpettes from the west but was unsuccessful. [23, 130]

The remainder of the morning was spent in preparing an attack to be made at 2:30 p. m., again in conjunction with the 32d Division. The advance was to be preceded by a 20-minute artillery preparation and assisted by a rolling barrage. [130]

The operation was executed as planned. With excellent artillery support, the 110th Infantry, attacking the western and

southern edges of Bois des Grimpettes, captured the wood and advanced north to the outskirts of Cierges. Later the front line was established about 200 meters north of Bois des Grimpettes and on the high ground overlooking Cierges. [23, 130]

The left of the 32d Division advanced through the eastern portion of Bois des Grimpettes and established contact with the 28th Division along the northern edge of the wood. On the left, contact was continued with the 42d Division southeast of Moulin Caranda. [130, 131]

Companies A and D, 110th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 109th Infantry, were sent into Bois des Grimpettes to assist in mopping up the wood and holding the position. Companies I and M, 109th Infantry, were sent to the support of the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry, on Cote 188. A German counter-attack from Bois Meunière was repulsed just before dusk. [23, 53, 132, 133]

Arrangements for the relief of the 28th Division were completed during the day. The 55th Infantry Brigade was relieved during the night of July 30-31 by the 63d Infantry Brigade, 32d Division, on the line, Bois des Grimpettes—Cote 188. Command of the zone passed to the 32d Division at 9 a. m., July 31. The 55th Infantry Brigade moved to the vicinity of Le Charmel, 3 kilometers south of Fresnes, and joined the remainder of the division in reserve of the French XXXVIII Corps. [1, 23, 134, 135, 136, 137]

On August 3 the XXXVIII Corps issued orders for the 32d Division to seize a bridgehead north of the Vesle and construct the necessary crossings for the 28th Division to execute a passage of lines and capture the plateau north of the river. Later in the day this plan was modified. The 32d Division was to continue the pursuit, while the 28th Division was to move up to the line, St. Gilles—Mont St. Martin and keep in close liaison with the 32d Division. [138, 139, 140]

At 8 a. m., August 4, the American III Corps took command of the zone of the French XXXVIII Corps, and announced that instructions issued by the French would remain in effect. [141, 142]

The 32d Division reached Fismes and the Vesle River on

Aug.
1-6

August 4, but was unable to cross to the north bank. At 5 p. m., August 6, the III Corps ordered the 28th Division to relieve the 32d Division during the night of August 6-7. [144, 145]

Acting on instructions issued by the Sixth Army that advance guards would establish a bridgehead north of the Vesle on the line, Courlandon—Baslieux—Perles—Paars, during the night of August 6-7, the American III Corps, which on the 5th had taken over the zone of action of the French III Corps to its right, ordered an advance in three columns, at a time to be announced later. The 28th Division was to capture the plateau 4 kilometers north of Fismes. The order of battle in the III Corps, from right to left, was to be the French 4th Division, 6th Infantry Brigade, American 3d Division, American 28th Division. To the left of the 28th Division was to be the American 4th Division, American I Corps. [146, 147, 148, 149]

While this attack was in preparation, the Sixth Army notified the III Corps that unless the I Corps, which attacked on August 6, succeeded in reaching the objective previously set, the attack of the III Corps was not to be made. In case the I Corps was successful, the III Corps was to attack, after having oriented the troops and arranged for sufficient artillery support. [150]

In the I Corps, the 4th Division crossed the river on August 6 and established a line along Route Nationale No. 31 de Rouen à Reims, west of Château du Diable. The 28th Division ordered the 56th Infantry Brigade to attack toward the general line, Blanzky-les-Fismes—Perles, for the purpose of seizing the two spurs to the northwest of Fismette on which Blanzky and Perles are located. [151, 152, 153]

The 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry, was to make the attack, starting from Route Nationale No. 31 west of Fismes. The first objective was a line through La Fontaine Qui Brule, while the final objective extended through Les Olivats and Perles, with the flanks refused. Strong patrols were to be sent to Fismes and Château du Diable. There was to be a 15-minute artillery preparation prior to the attack, which was to be covered by a rolling barrage. The 103d Engineers and the 107th Engineers, less the 1st Battalion (32d Division), which had been

attached to the 28th Division for the operation, were to build the necessary bridges for the crossing. [1, 148, 153]

The Aisne-Marne Offensive closed on August 6, by which time the Germans had been driven north of the Vesle and Aisne Rivers. French General Headquarters directed that the French Fifth, Sixth and Tenth Armies would take no action in force north of the Vesle River. They were, however, to continue operations to establish bridgeheads north of the Vesle for the purpose of securing a line of departure for a new offensive and to engage the enemy on this front while the British launched the Somme Offensive to the northwest on August 8. [5, 143]

The relief of the 32d Division was accomplished by the 56th Infantry Brigade, which placed the 2d and 3d Battalions, 112th Infantry, in line at Fismes and in Bois de Larribonnet respectively. The 57th Field Artillery Brigade, 32d Division, together with the 147th Field Artillery, 41st Division, and the 3d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery, 3d Division, remained in line, in support of the 28th Division. Command passed at daylight, August 7. The limits of the zone of action assigned to the 28th Division were as follows:

Aug. 7

Right boundary: Fismes (incl.)—Baslieux (excl.)—Glennes (incl.).

Left boundary: Mont St. Martin (incl.)—Perles (excl.)—Blanzly-les-Fismes (incl.).

The 6th Infantry Brigade, 3d Division, III Corps, was to the right and the 4th Division, I Corps, to the left. [1, 23, 148, 155, 156, 157, 158]

About 11:30 a. m. the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, was ordered to cross the Vesle and cover the right flank of the troops of the I Corps, already established on the north bank. At 12:30 p. m. Companies I, L and M crossed the river at Le Grand Savar on fallen logs and established a line south of the railroad outside of the divisional zone, where contact was effected with the support line of the 4th Division. [23]

The general advance of the III Corps was set for the afternoon of August 7. There were misunderstandings as to H-hour, however, and the attacks were uncoordinated and unsuccessful.

The 28th Division ordered its troops to advance at 7 p. m. [23, 159]

Owing to the absence of bridges and cover in the center of the zone of action, the plan of attack was changed by verbal orders. The 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry, which was originally directed to make the attack, was ordered to move to the left and cross the river by infiltration. The 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, was ordered to clean up Fismette. [23]

The 1st Battalion was unsuccessful in its attempt at crossing. The 2d Battalion entered Fismette, but was forced to return to the south bank before midnight. [23]

Aug. 8 A local operation was conducted at 5 a. m., August 8, after a 1-hour artillery preparation. The 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, attacked with the mission of cleaning up Fismette. Companies F, G and H, and a part of Company C crossed the river and established themselves in Fismette and along the dirt road to the east. Fire from the front and flanks forced these companies back into Fismes. After an artillery preparation of 2½ hours this battalion attacked again at 1:30 p. m. and secured a foothold in the southern and eastern parts of Fismette. [23, 157]

To the left, the right brigade of the 4th Division was heavily shelled and forced to move back to the railroad. [151]

In accordance with instructions from higher authority, the Sixth Army had issued orders on August 7 for its troops to organize for defense and to limit their operations to securing sufficient ground north of the Vesle River to permit the erection and maintenance of bridges. In the sector of the III Corps it was desired to have the front line follow the Vesle River, with small bridgeheads on the north bank. The bridgeheads were to be established by operations planned in detail and with proper artillery support. Once gained, they were to be held by a minimum of troops. Reconnaissance parties of the strength of a company were to be sent out from the bridgeheads to determine the location and strength of the enemy main line of resistance. [160]

On August 8 these instructions were embodied in orders of the III Corps, which directed the 28th Division to organize its position and make no attack until further orders. [161]

Several local German attacks were defeated on August 9. The 111th Infantry relieved the 112th Infantry at 5 p. m., the relief of front-line elements taking place during the night of August 9-10. The 1st Battalion, 111th Infantry, was in Fismette and the 2d Battalion along the railroad in the western part of the sector. [23, 157, 162, 163, 164] *Aug. 9*

Anticipating a weakening of the enemy resistance as a result of the success of the Somme Offensive, the III Corps at 9 a. m. ordered the 28th Division to establish small bridgeheads north of the Vesle by local operations without bringing on a general engagement. [165]

The 28th Division ordered the 56th Infantry Brigade to capture the spur northwest of Fismette by attacking at 4:30 a. m., August 10, with the line, Les Olivats—la Petite Logette—southern edge of Perles, as the objective. The attack was to be made by one company from each front-line battalion, followed by a third company charged with cleaning up the ravines. Assault companies were to start from the line, unimproved road running west from Le Moulin Moineau—northern outskirts of Fismette—northern edge of wood 500 meters west of Fismette. There was to be a 30-minute artillery preparation prior to the attack, and the advance was to be covered by a rolling barrage. [166, 167]

A similar attack was planned for the capture of the spur northeast of Fismette if this attack should prove successful. [168, 169]

The attack, executed by the 111th Infantry, consisted of an advance at 4:30 a. m., August 10, by three companies of the 1st Battalion. Notwithstanding heavy casualties, these units occupied all of Fismette and advanced several hundred meters before being forced to return to the town. During the day the 3d Battalion, 111th Infantry, less Company K, moved into Fismes and Fismette to support the 1st Battalion. [23, 164] *Aug. 10*

At 10:30 a. m. the 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, less Company E, was ordered to clean out the machine-gun nests around Château du Diable. The left elements crossed the railroad and formed a line facing northeast. The battalion then ad-

vanced on both sides of the railroad and occupied the woods as far as Route Nationale No. 31. The battalion withdrew a short distance after dark. Company K, 111th Infantry, took up a position on the left flank of the battalion. Company E, which had been attached to the 1st Battalion for the morning attack, was in the front line at Tannerie, south of the Vesle, throughout the day. [23, 170, 171]

Aug.
11-12

On August 11 the 28th Division ordered the 111th Infantry to conduct a raid for the purpose of obtaining prisoners and capturing matériel located in the ravines and along the sunken road leading south from Mont de Perté and La Fosse au Loup. The raiding party of two companies was to be supported by artillery fire during the advance. This raid started at 5 p. m., August 11. Companies L and M, 111th Infantry, advanced a short distance northeast of Fismette, but were forced to return to the town without accomplishing their mission. On the left of the sector, Companies A and B, 109th Infantry, reinforced the lines of the 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry. [23, 164, 170, 172]

The French 164th Division relieved the 6th Infantry Brigade, 3d Division, to the right of the 28th Division, during the night of August 10-11, and took command of the sector at 8 a. m. on the 11th. [173, 174]

There was little offensive activity on the part of the 28th Division on August 12. The enemy recaptured several houses in the northern edge of Fismette. [138, 175]

To the left of the 28th Division, the 77th Division relieved the 4th Division, command passing at noon on the 12th. [176]

As part of a reorganization of the Sixth Army and the III Corps, the 28th Division ordered the 55th Infantry Brigade to relieve the French 164th Division and the troops of the 56th Infantry Brigade in Fismette and Fismes during the night of August 12-13. [177, 178, 179]

In accomplishing these changes it was ordered that the left half of the 56th Infantry Brigade's sector would first be taken over by the 153d Infantry Brigade, 77th Division. These movements were to be carried out during the night of August 12-13, and the 28th Division was to take command of the new

sector at 8 a. m., August 13. The limits of the new sector were to be:

Right boundary: Ormont Ferme (excl.)—Romain (excl.).

Left boundary: roadfork 600 meters southwest of Fismes—Fismette (incl.)—Hill 175.8 (incl.)—Maizy (incl.). [180, 181, 182]

The 55th Infantry Brigade relieved the French 164th Division and placed the 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, in the front line generally south of Route Nationale No. 31, through Maigneux and Villette. The 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, relieved the 111th Infantry in Fismette and Fismes. These movements were completed at 4:05 a. m., August 13. [183]

Aug. 13'

The relief in the left subsector was delayed until the evening of August 13, when the 77th Division relieved the 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, and attached troops, north of the Vesle River. [23, 184]

The 55th Infantry Brigade established front-line contact with the French 20th Division, Fifth Army, to the right of the new sector, and liaison with the 77th Division, to the left. [185]

Orders of the III Corps required that, upon the completion of the relief, the sector was to be organized for defense. At the same time aggressive reconnaissance was to be conducted and small bridgeheads were to be established with a view to a further advance. Under the assumption that the enemy held the terrain between the Vesle and Aisne Rivers with only a small force, the III Corps ordered the 28th and 77th Divisions each to prepare a reconnaissance to be made by a force of about one company, with artillery preparation and a box barrage. The purpose of these operations was to ascertain whether or not the north bank of the Vesle was held in force. A successful advance of the reconnoitering party was to be followed by a widening of any bridgehead gained. The date for the operation was to be announced later. [182, 186]

The period August 14 to 17 was marked by frequent patrolling, which disclosed that the Germans held the railroad track south of the Vesle opposite the right half of the 28th Division's

*Aug.
14-17*

line, and were entrenched just north of Fismette opposite the left half. [187]

On the right of the division, the 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, attacked after dark on the 16th with the mission of establishing a line along the railroad track. Under heavy fire, small detachments reached the objective, but all were forced to return to the line of departure. [23, 188]

On the left, Company I, 109th Infantry, drove the enemy out of the northern part of Fismette on the evening of August 14. On the night of August 16-17 the Germans again occupied houses in the western edge of the town. [23]

Aug.
18-24 On August 18 the French Tenth Army launched the Oise-Aisne Offensive by attacking in the vicinity of Noyon, 60 kilometers northwest of Fismes, in the first phase of an operation designed to force the enemy to abandon his defensive lines along the Aisne and Vesle Rivers. In view of the initial success of this operation, the Sixth Army on August 20 warned its troops to take the necessary measures to insure the immediate pursuit of any German withdrawal. [5, 189]

During the period August 18-24 the 28th Division engaged in patrolling, routine reliefs, and the organization of defensive works. [138]

In the right subsector, the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry, relieved the 1st Battalion of that regiment during the night of August 18-19. [23, 190]

At 5 a. m., August 19, the 56th Infantry Brigade took command of the left subsector. The reliefs involved were made on the nights of August 17-18 and 18-19. The 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry, took over the front line in Fismette at 2:15 a. m., August 18. [187, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195]

During the night of August 21-22 Company A, 112th Infantry, occupied the northwestern edge of Fismette, and during the day cleared the town of the enemy. During the night of August 22-23 the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, relieved the 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry, in Fismette and Fismes. [23, 195, 196]

To the right, the French 9th Division relieved the French 20th Division on August 24. [149]

On August 19 the Sixth Army directed attention to the importance of obtaining possession of all ground south of the Vesle River, and on August 21 the III Corps directed that this be accomplished without delay. In the sector of the 28th Division this applied to the front held by the 110th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry, in the front line, was ordered to attack at 3:30 a. m., August 25. It was to seize the railroad track to its front, and drive the enemy from the south bank of the Vesle. The advance was to be preceded by a 40-minute artillery preparation and covered by a standing barrage placed on the north bank of the Vesle. [197, 198, 199]

The attack was carried out on August 25 as planned. Companies M, L and I, in line from right to left, with Company K in support, reached the objective and established outposts to the front. Companies I, K and L were forced by heavy machine-gun and artillery fire to return to the line of departure, while Company M held a position along the railroad track until after midnight, August 25. [23, 200, 201]

Aug.
25-27

The sector was quiet on August 26. During the night of August 26-27 Companies E and F, 110th Infantry, relieved Companies L and M of that regiment. In the left subsector, the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, relieved the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, in Fismes and Fismette. [195, 202, 203]

At 4 a. m., August 27, soon after the completion of the relief in Fismette, the enemy laid a box barrage on the town. In the attack that followed, Fismette was lost and most of Companies G and H, 112th Infantry, comprising its garrison, were killed or captured. The 112th Infantry established a line in Fismes, south of the Vesle. [23, 195, 204]

In the right subsector, the 2d Battalion, 110th Infantry, completed the relief of the 3d Battalion in the outpost zone at 1:35 a. m., August 28. [205]

During the period August 28-September 3, attempts by the 110th Infantry to establish a line along the railroad were unsuccessful. Patrols succeeded, however, in capturing prisoners and in locating the enemy positions. [206]

Aug. 28-
Sept. 3

At 2 a. m., September 1, the 28th Division laid down a smoke barrage prepared by Company B, 1st Gas Regiment, on Le

Roland Usine north of Villette. The purpose of this was to determine the nature of the hostile reaction to a threatened attack. While this was in progress, troops in the outpost zone of the 110th Infantry withdrew about 300 meters to avoid the enemy fire. [207, 208]

In the zone of the 55th Infantry Brigade, the 109th Infantry relieved the 110th Infantry during the night of September 1-2, placing the 2d Battalion in line. [209]

In the zone of the 56th Infantry Brigade, patrols of the 112th Infantry drew heavy fire whenever they approached the south bank of the Vesle. The 111th Infantry relieved the 112th Infantry during the night of August 31-September 1, the 3d Battalion taking over the front line. [195, 210]

The second phase of the Oise-Aisne Offensive of the French Tenth Army was launched on August 29, and by September 3 important gains had been made. As a result of these successes, the enemy withdrew during the night of September 3-4 to the previously prepared lines of the Romain Riegels and Aisne Stellung. In the zone of advance of the 28th Division, these positions followed the general line, edges of woods east of Courlandon—Glennes. [211, 212]

The plan for a vigorous pursuit prepared by the Sixth Army in anticipation of a weakening of the German resistance on its front was soon to be put into effect. The plan provided the following zone of action for the 28th Division:

Right boundary: Courlandon (incl.)—crossroads 300 meters west of Huit Voisins (incl.)—le Grand Hameau (incl.)—Meurival (incl.).

Left boundary: Fismes (excl.)—Ruisseau Ste. Marie—la Corbeauche—Glennes (incl.)—Maizy (incl.). [213, 214]

In compliance with corps and division orders, the 55th Infantry Brigade had prepared to advance through the line of the 56th Infantry Brigade in two columns, the 109th Infantry on the right and the 110th Infantry on the left. The 56th Infantry Brigade, after being passed through by the 55th Infantry Brigade, was to assemble in corps reserve south of the Vesle. [214, 216, 217, 218, 219]

The advance guards were to cross the Vesle and establish bridgeheads along the line, Les Anglais—les Gaillards—à la Grande Grève. The main bodies were to pass through the bridgeheads and advance to the first objective, the high ground extending from Beaugilet Ferme to Blanzly-les-Fismes. The final objective was the Chemin des Dames, north of the Aisne River. [216, 219]

The unusual inactivity by the enemy along the front indicated a withdrawal. This was verified by reconnaissance patrols in the area to the west of the 28th Division on the morning of September 4. As a result, the III Corps, under instructions from the Sixth Army, put into effect at noon, September 4, the plans for the pursuit. H-hour was set for 3 p. m. in order to insure uniform aggressive action along the corps front. Minor operations in progress prior to H-hour were to be continued. [220, 221] Sept. 4

The 55th Infantry Brigade advanced at 3 p. m. as planned. The 2d Battalion, 109th Infantry, leading the right column, crossed the Vesle and took up a position north of Les Gaillards. The 1st Battalion, 109th Infantry, came up to the right of the 2d Battalion and extended the line to the southeast along the edge of La Fosse au Diable. This regiment was in contact with the new German position. At the close of the day there was a gap of about 1 kilometer between the 28th Division and the French to the right. [23, 222, 223, 224]

The left column was led by the 2d Battalion, 110th Infantry, which passed west of Baslieux and occupied the high ground to the north. The 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, followed the 2d Battalion and extended the line to the left. [23, 222]

The III Corps directed that the attack would be continued on September 5 with objectives unchanged. Heads of columns were to seize crossings of the Aisne Canal and Aisne River and establish bridgeheads on the north bank. The 28th Division ordered strong patrols sent out to reconnoiter the crossings. [226, 227]

Early on the morning of September 5 patrols developed strong resistance from machine-gun nests directly to the front. In compliance with telephonic instructions from the corps and Sept. 5

division, the 56th Infantry Brigade, at 12:45 p. m., ordered the 111th Infantry to seize and occupy the line, Le Grand Hameau—Beauregard Ferme—Maizy, in order to protect the right flank of the 55th Infantry Brigade. [138, 228, 229]

The 111th Infantry moved from St. Gilles in advance-guard formation at 3:30 p. m., the 2d Battalion leading. While this movement was in progress, the division ordered the regiment to enter the line on the right of the existing American right flank and assist in repelling a threatened counterattack. At 8:06 p. m. the 2d Battalion was closing the gap between the French and the 109th Infantry by placing two companies in line on the ridge 1,500 meters northeast of Courlandon. [23, 224]

In the left column, the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry, crossed the Vesle at 5:40 a. m., passed through the 1st and 2d Battalions north of Baslieux and took up a position near the trenches 1,200 meters north of the town. [23, 222, 228]

The III Corps ordered operations continued on the 6th without changes in missions. The 28th Division was to keep in close touch with the French to the right and be prepared to assist them. [235]

Sept. 6 The 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, attacked at 8 a. m., September 6, and reached the railroad track 1,500 meters south of Glennes, but was forced by flanking fire to withdraw to the line of departure. [23, 230]

At 1 p. m. the division executed a general attack in conjunction with the French. On the right, the 111th Infantry advanced toward Romain with the 2d Battalion in the assault echelon and the 1st Battalion in support. A gain of about 300 meters was made and held against a counterattack at 2 p. m. Companies A and D reinforced the front line. [23, 231]

The 109th Infantry attacked with the 1st and 2d Battalions in line from right to left and the 3d Battalion in support. The three strongpoints, Les Epinettes, Les Terres Oudry and Le Poteau were captured. The front line was reinforced by the 3d Battalion. A German counterattack launched at 6:15 p. m. was repulsed. [23, 232, 233]

The 110th Infantry attacked with the 2d and 1st Battalions

in line from right to left. The strongpoint, La Borne Carrée, and nearby trenches were captured and the line extended to the northwest to the railroad. Late in the afternoon the 3d Battalion passed through the 1st and 2d Battalions, crossed the railroad and took up a position about 1 kilometer south of Glennes. [23, 232]

Liaison was established with the 77th Division to the left and contact with the French 9th Division to the right. [231, 232]

The III Corps ordered the French 62d Division to relieve the 28th Division during the nights of September 6-7 and 7-8. Command was to pass to the French at 8 a. m., September 8. [235, 236]

At daybreak on the 7th the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry, was moved back to the line of the 1st and 2d Battalions south of the railroad. At 5 a. m. the right of the division was attacked by the enemy in an endeavor to regain his former outpost line. The attack was beaten off. On the remainder of the front the 28th Division maintained contact with the enemy by patrols. [23, 215, 225, 232] Sept. 7

The French Fifth Army took over the zone of action of the French Sixth Army on September 7. [149]

The relief of the 28th Division was accomplished as ordered and the French 62d Division assumed command of the sector at 8 a. m., September 8. The 28th Division assembled in the vicinity of Arcis-le-Ponsart, about 8 kilometers south of Fismes. From there it moved to the Meuse-Argonne region to participate in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. [1, 138, 215]

CASUALTIES, CHÂTEAU-THIERRY SECTOR, CHAMPAGNE-MARNE DEFENSIVE, AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE, FISMES SECTOR AND OISE-AISNE OFFENSIVE

		June 28-July 14	July 15-18	July 19-27	July 28-31	Aug. 1-6	Aug. 7-17	Aug. 18-Sept. 8	Sept. 9-10	Total
<i>28th Division</i>										
109th Inf.....	W.....	11	336	22	344	63	223	753	8	1,760
	DW.....		23	2	18	3	15	49	1	111
	K.....	1	109	6	51	7	14	128		316
110th Inf.....	W.....	10	111	31	710	96	130	540	23	1,651
	DW.....		7	1	32	8	1	28		77
	K.....		84	1	199	22	5	95		406

CASUALTIES, CHÂTEAU-THIERRY SECTOR, CHAMPAGNE-MARNE DEFENSIVE, AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE, FISMES SECTOR AND OISE-AISNE OFFENSIVE (Continued)

		June 28- July 14	July 15-18	July 19-27	July 28-31	Aug. 1-6	Aug. 7-17	Aug. 18- Sept. 8	Sept. 9-10	Total
<i>88th Division—Continued</i>										
111th Inf.-----	W	57	50	157	7	5	526	458	7	1,267
(DS July 16-19 and 23-25)	DW	2	5	2	1		26	26		62
	K	22	3	2			158	53		238
112th Inf.-----	W	52	197	21	13	25	375	218	1	902
(DS July 23-25)	DW	2	3				8	22		35
	K	8	15	9		1	51	61		145
107th FA (DS until Aug. 7)	W						22	149	4	175
	DW						2	7		9
	K						1	11		12
106th FA (DS until Aug. 7)	W						13	71		84
	DW						1	3		4
	K						1	9		10
109th FA (DS until Aug. 7)	W						27	105	2	134
	DW						2	9		11
	K						3	8		11
107th MG Bn (DS July 31-Aug. 2)	W		1		1	1		3		6
	DW									
	K									
106th MG Bn-----	W	3	17		16	1	46	135		218
	DW		2		3		2	8		15
	K		7				8	7		22
109th MG Bn (DS July 23-25)	W	1	6	2			110	136	2	257
	DW						3	5		8
	K						5	5		10
103d Engrs-----	W	21	232	9	10	43	76	103	1	495
	DW		4				2	4		11
	K		15				8	1		24
Others-----	W		4	4	9	5	31	55	4	112
	DW				1	4	1	10		16
	K		2		1	1	3	2		9
Total-----		190	1,233	269	1,416	286	1,899	3,277	53	8,623
<i>Attached Units</i>										
119th FA (32d Div.) (Aug. 7-12)	W						53			53
	DW						2			2
	K						6			6
120th FA (32d Div.) (Aug. 7-12 and Aug. 18-25)	W						3	5		8
	DW						1			1
	K						1	1		2
121st FA (32d Div.) (Aug. 7-12)	W						19			19
	DW									
	K									
107th AmTn (32d Div.) (Aug. 7-12)	W						2			2
	DW									
	K									
107th Engrs (32d Div.) (less 1st Bn) (Aug. 7-12)	W						9			9
	DW									
	K									
3d Bn, 18th FA (3d Div.) (Aug. 7-12)	W						4			4
	DW						1			1
	K						2			2
147th FA (41st Div.) (Aug. 7-12 and Aug. 18-25)	W						20	18		38
	DW						1	1		2
	K									
Total-----							124	25		149
Aggregate total-----		190	1,233	269	1,416	286	2,023	3,302	53	8,772

W=wounds not mortal; DW=died of wounds; K=killed in action; DS=detached service.

Clermont Sector and Meuse-Argonne Offensive

CLERMONT SECTOR, SEPTEMBER 19-25
MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER 26-
OCTOBER 10

FROM THE TIME that the American Commander-in-Chief arrived in France, he bent every effort toward organizing an American army under American command at the earliest possible moment. To accomplish this would normally consume considerable time because it would first be necessary to transport a large number of troops to Europe, provide for their supply and complete their training. The organization of this army was further deferred by the critical situation created by the German offensives launched in the spring and early summer of 1918. These offensives so depleted the Allied reserves that the Allies faced almost certain defeat unless they received immediate support. In this crisis the American Commander-in-Chief postponed for the time being the concentration of American divisions for the formation of an American army, and made all American combatant forces available for service with the British and French armies. With this assistance, the Allies were able not only to stop the German offensives before they gained a decisive victory but, on July 18, to launch the Aisne-Marne Offensive against the Germans in the Marne salient. On July 24, while this offensive was still in progress, a strategic offensive plan was agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief which included a mission for an American army. The immediate purpose of this plan was to reduce the salients which interfered with railroad communications which were essential to further offensive operations. One of these was the St. Mihiel salient. [3, 237]

The American First Army was organized on August 10, and

on August 30 assumed command of the front from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle River, to Watronville, 11 kilometers southeast of Verdun. From September 12 to 16 it conducted the St. Mihiel Offensive which resulted in the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. [3]

With the reduction of the St. Mihiel and other salients the immediate purpose of the strategic offensive plan of July 24 had been accomplished, and it became possible to undertake the great converging offensives which had been agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief early in September. These offensives included an American attack to be launched on September 26 between the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest, supported on the left by the French Fourth Army between the Argonne and the Suippes River; a renewal of the Somme Offensive on September 27; and a combined Allied attack east of Ypres on September 28. Between these principal offensives, secondary operations were to be undertaken. [237, 238, 239, 418]

The Meuse-Argonne Offensive of the American First Army was to be directed against the principal German lateral line of supply, the Carignan—Sedan—Mézières railroad which, at Sedan, lay 53 kilometers from the front. The severing of this artery would render the German positions to the west and northwest of Sedan untenable. [237]

Protecting this vital supply line, the Germans had, during the previous four years, constructed a strong system of field fortifications. On the Meuse-Argonne front, there were four distinct defensive positions. The first lay close behind the front line. The second included Montfaucon and traversed the Argonne south of Apremont. The third, which was known to the Germans as the Kriemhild Stellung, formed a part of their great defensive system, popularly called the Hindenburg Line, which ran from the vicinity of Metz to the North Sea. This position extended from Bois de Forêt, across the heights of Cunel and Romagne, to include the high ground north of Grandpré. The fourth position included the heights of Barricourt, and extended westward to Buzancy and Thénorgues. The first three positions had been thoroughly organized, and

numerous intermediate positions constructed between them. These defenses, together with the natural military strength of the terrain, presented a formidable obstacle to an attacking army. The importance of the communications protected by this front made it certain that the Germans would resist here to the last extremity. [237]

The plan of the First Army contemplated an initial advance of 16 kilometers and a penetration of the hostile third position. This penetration would force the enemy to evacuate the Argonne Forest, and insure the junction of the First Army with the French Fourth Army at Grandpré. A further advance of 16 kilometers was then to be made to the line, Stenay—le Chesne. Such an advance would outflank the enemy's position along the Aisne River, in front of the French Fourth Army, and clear the way for an advance on Mézières or Sedan. These operations were to be supplemented by an attack to clear the heights east of the Meuse River as far as Bois de la Grande Montagne. [237]

In preparation for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the front of the First Army was extended from Watronville to the west edge of the Argonne Forest on September 22. The attack was to be launched at 5:30 a. m., September 26, with the III, V and I Corps in line from right to left. West of the Argonne Forest, the French Fourth Army was to attack in conjunction with the American forces. Elements of the First Army east of the Meuse were not to attack during the opening days of the offensive. [237]



The following paragraphs, in *italic*, are a synopsis of the service of the 28th Division in the Clermont Sector and Meuse-Argonne Offensive. This synopsis is designed to make the principal facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact form.

During the night of September 18-19 and 19-20, the 28th Division relieved elements of the French 73d and 120th Divisions in the Clermont Sector. It held this sector behind a screen of French troops and prepared to take part in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.

When the Meuse-Argonne Offensive opened on September 26, the 28th Division attacked as the center division of the I Corps. The right of the division advanced 5 kilometers; the left, in the eastern edge of the Argonne Forest, gained 2 kilometers.

The attack continued on September 27. The right brigade captured Monblainville and established its line to the north of the town. The left brigade was unable to advance.

On September 28 the right brigade reached Apremont and established a line of resistance to the east, north and west of the town. The left brigade gained a foothold on Le Chene Tendu. The attack continued on September 29 but the line was not materially advanced during the day.

The organization of a defensive line, Apremont—le Chene Tendu—Pont à l'Aune was completed on September 30 and preparations were made for a further advance.

On October 1 the crest of Le Chene Tendu was gained.

No attacks in force were made on October 2. Patrols were pushed toward Châtel-Chéhéry and Cote 180. There were local actions on October 3 but the line was unchanged.

On October 4 the right brigade established its line east of the Aire River south of Fléville. The left brigade made small gains.

On October 5 the right brigade occupied La Forge and held the line of the Aire from just south of Fléville to near Apremont.

No attack was made on October 6 but preparations were made for a general attack to be launched on the following day. On October 7 Châtel-Chéhéry was taken. The line for the night extended from the hill west of Châtel-Chéhéry to the southwestern slopes of Cote 244.

The right of the division advanced to the narrow-gauge railroad 2 kilometers west of Châtel-Chéhéry on October 8. The left advanced to the road running southwest from the crossroads southwest of Cote 244.

The division was relieved by the 82d Division on October 9.

Sept. 19-25 Following its relief north of Fismes on September 8, the 28th Division moved by successive stages to the area of the French Second Army. On September 18 the division was moving north to the area, Neuville—le Claon—la Chalade, as a part

of the concentration for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. During the night of September 18-19 the division began the relief of elements of the French 73d and 120th Divisions in the Clermont Sector, which extended from Boureuilles to Pierre Croisée. Except for French outpost detachments left in front of the division as a screen, the division completed the relief of the French in its sector during the night of September 19-20. At noon on September 20 the 28th Division passed to the control of the I Corps, under the provisions of field orders, American First Army, issued on September 17. The French troops in the outpost positions were not relieved until the night of September 25-26. [240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 256]

On September 20 the First Army issued its field orders for the opening of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. The attack was to be supported on the left by the French Fourth Army, which was to assist in the reduction of the Argonne Forest by out-flanking it from the west. East of the Meuse, the IV Corps, French II Colonial Corps and French XVII Corps, from right to left, were to participate in the artillery preparation and conduct deep raids at the hour of attack. In addition, the French XVII Corps was directed to assist in neutralizing hostile fire and observation from the heights east of the Meuse, and hold itself in readiness to attack. West of the Meuse the order of battle by corps and front-line divisions was as follows:

<i>I CORPS</i>	<i>V CORPS</i>	<i>III CORPS</i>
77th-28th-35th	91st-37th-79th	4th-80th-33d

The following principal objectives, which were coordinated with those of the French Fourth Army, were established:

Corps objective: Dannevoux—Nantillois—Montblainville.
 American Army objective: Briulles-sur-Meuse—Bois de Forêt—southern portion of Bois des Rappes—Exermont—Apremont—Binarville.

Combined army first-phase line: Briulles-sur-Meuse—north edge of Bois des Rappes—Banthevillle (incl.)—Côte de Châtillon (incl.)—Fléville (excl.)—Apremont (incl.)—Binarville.

Combined army first objective: Briulles-sur-Meuse—north edge of Bois des Rappes—south edge of Bois d'Andevanne—north tip of the Argonne Forest.

Combined army second objective: Dun-sur-Meuse—le Chesne—Attigny.

The III Corps was to protect the right and organize the line of the Meuse for defense. It was to advance promptly and penetrate the hostile second position, thus turning Montfaucon, and thereby assisting in the capture of the hostile second position in the zone of action of the V Corps. The V Corps was to outflank Bois de Montfaucon and Bois de Cheppy from the east and west, thereby protecting the III and I Corps from enemy fire and observation from these positions. The I Corps was to reduce the Argonne Forest by flanking it from the east. Each corps was to advance to the corps objective without waiting for units to the flanks. The advance to the American Army objective, which would penetrate the hostile third position in the vicinity of Cunel, was to be based on the V Corps and regulated by the corps commanders. The attack was to be pushed vigorously. This objective was to be gained during the afternoon of the first day, and exploitation pushed to the north during the night. Beyond the American Army objective, the advance was to be regulated by army orders. The combined army first objective was to be organized for defense and the success exploited toward the line, Dun-sur-Meuse—Buzancy—Grandpré. The artillery was to devote special attention to neutralizing hostile fire and observation from the heights east of the Meuse, Montfaucon and the east edge of the Argonne Forest. [237, 252]

Pursuant to the field orders of the First Army, the I Corps issued field orders at 4 p. m., September 22, for the attack of September 26. The corps front extended from Vauquois, inclusive, to La Harazée, exclusive, and the order of battle for the attack was to be, 35th, 28th and 77th Divisions, from right to left. In accordance with the army plan the right of the I Corps was to drive rapidly down the Aire valley, east of the Argonne Forest, thereby flanking the enemy's positions in the forest. A

heavy attack was not contemplated within the forest itself. [252, 253]

The zone of action prescribed for the 28th Division was as follows:

Right boundary: Boureuilles (incl.)—Varennes (incl.)—Montblainville (incl.)—Apremont (incl.)—Fléville (excl.).

Left boundary: a line parallel to the right boundary and about $3\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers west of it. [253]

The field orders of the 28th Division were issued at 4 p. m., September 24. On the front of the division, the prescribed objectives were:

1st maneuver line: a northeast-southwest line about 1 kilometer north of the line, Boureuilles—Courte Chaussée.

2d maneuver line: a northeast-southwest line 500 meters north of Varennes—Champ Mahaut.

Corps objective: a northeast-southwest line just north of the line, La Forge, southeast of Montblainville—les Escomportes Ferme—les Précipices.

The division ordered the advance to be made along the lines of least resistance with the purpose of flanking enemy strong-points. The artillery preparation was to begin at 2:30 a. m. in coordination with the fire along the entire army front. A machine-gun barrage was to be fired initially and the attack was to be launched at 5:30 a. m. behind a rolling barrage. The Argonne Forest was to be reduced by artillery fire and mopped up from the south and east as the advance progressed. Organizations were directed to report their arrival on the corps objective by every means of liaison available and to be prepared to advance beyond this objective at 10 a. m. The brigades were to be notified to resume the advance by a rocket signal from the command post of the 28th Division. Upon reaching the combined army first objective (2 kilometers north of Marcq) the division was to organize for defense in depth, and push exploitation detachments to the line, Buzancy—Thénorgues—Talma. [254]

The general formation ordered for the attack was as follows:

56TH INFANTRY BRIGADE		55TH INFANTRY BRIGADE	
112th Infantry		109th Infantry	110th Infantry
3d Battalion		3d Battalion	1st Battalion
2d Battalion		2d Battalion	2d Battalion
1st Battalion			3d Battalion
<i>Brigade Reserve</i>		<i>Brigade Reserve</i>	
3d Battalion, 111th Infantry		1st Battalion, 109th Infantry	
DIVISION RESERVE			
111th Infantry, less 3d Battalion			
[23, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261]			

The 56th Infantry Brigade was to have one battalion in the assault line east of the Argonne Forest, one battalion echeloned to the left rear of the leading battalion as a combat group, and a third battalion to attack along the Pierre Croisée—Petite Grurie road. Each brigade was ordered to detail one rifle company plus one platoon of machine guns to maintain combat liaison with flank divisions. Two 75-mm guns were attached to each assault battalion. One American tank company was assigned to the division. A battery of artillery and a platoon of engineers were designated to assist the tanks. [254]

The 55th Infantry Brigade directed that one company from the reserve battalion of the right regiment, the 110th Infantry, would attack Boureuilles from a position on the line of departure. It was to be supported from the south and southwest at H-hour, by machine guns and 37-mm guns, and after thoroughly mopping up the town was to rejoin its battalion west of the Aire River. A passage of lines was prescribed at the first maneuver line, when the support battalions were to pass through the leading battalions of each regiment and carry the assault to the second maneuver line. The battalions passed through were to follow the new assault battalions as support, and were in turn to pass through the lines at the second maneuver line and carry the assault to the corps objective. [261]

The 56th Infantry Brigade ordered one battalion of the 112th Infantry to form on the southern slopes of Hill 263 and the

two rear battalions to form and operate as prescribed by the division. [260]

During the day of September 25 both brigades arranged to relieve the French troops in the advanced positions on the following night. All troops were ordered to be in position four hours before the hour of attack. [256, 260, 261]

The attack was launched at 5:30 a. m., September 26. [256] *Sept. 26*

On the extreme right, the 110th Infantry, supported by tanks, attacked behind the rolling barrage. Company I, of the reserve battalion, moved out to establish combat liaison with the 35th Division to the right. The tanks lost direction in the fog, but the infantry made good progress and by 10 a. m. had taken Boureuilles, Petite Boureuilles and Tranchée de Boureuilles. About this time the 2d Battalion, 110th Infantry, passed through the lines of the 1st Battalion and continued the advance. Varennes was reached by Company H about 10:30 a. m., and by 11:30 a. m. the remainder of the 2d Battalion had come up and occupied the town, the eastern part of which had been cleared by units of the 35th Division. Here the advance was held up by enemy machine guns, but this resistance was overcome, and by 2 p. m. a position was reached on the plateau about 1¼ kilometers north of Varennes. The 3d Battalion, portions of which had preceded the 2d Battalion, took over the front from the latter, which went into support. The 1st Battalion also took over part of the front line. Positions were consolidated south of La Forge for the night. The line extended southwest for about 1 kilometer from a point on the railroad about 500 meters southeast of La Forge. There was no front-line liaison to either flank. [23, 256, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266]

On the left of the 55th Infantry Brigade, the 109th Infantry, supported by tanks, attacked at 5:30 a.m. The 3d Battalion had trouble getting through the wire on its front, but by 8:45 a.m. had reached Tranchée de Boureuilles. About this time the 2d Battalion passed through the 3d and continued the attack, reaching Tranchée des fils de fer about noon, where the advance was held up by enemy machine-gun fire. Further attempts of this battalion to advance were not successful, and it remained for the night in Tranchée des fils de fer. During

the day Company A, 109th Infantry, from brigade reserve, was employed to mop up behind the 3d Battalion, but lost direction and during the afternoon held temporary positions on the eastern slopes of Cote des Perrieres. About 5 p. m. Companies B, C and D, 109th Infantry, under directions of the 55th Infantry Brigade, passed through the 2d and 3d Battalions and took positions in trenches southwest of Varennes. This line extended from the roadfork at the western edge of the town southwest about 1 kilometer. Here it remained for the night, with no front-line liaison to either flank. [23, 264]

On the left, the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, attacked through a line, a portion of which was held by elements of Company K, 111th Infantry. There was some disorganization in the attack, and great difficulty was experienced in advancing through the woods and the enemy trenches to the front. Company I, 112th Infantry, gained contact with the 77th Division, to the left, about 9 a. m. but later lost touch with that division. By afternoon the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, less Company I, out of touch with all other units, approached the southern slopes of Cote des Perrieres. The 2d and 1st Battalions advanced down the valley of the Aire until the first enemy wire was reached at Tranchée de Boureuilles, when movements to the left began. Two companies of the 2d Battalion reached the positions of the 3d Battalion early in the afternoon. By 4 p. m. elements of all three battalions of the 112th Infantry were along the southern slope of Cote des Perrieres, south of Champ Mahaut. The 3d Battalion, 111th Infantry, in brigade reserve, reached the southern slope of Cote des Perrieres during the afternoon and established liaison between the right flank of the 77th Division and the left of the 112th Infantry. At 5 p. m. the 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, from division reserve, moved from the vicinity of Etang du Molly to maintain contact with the 77th Division. This battalion reached a position in the trenches south of Bas Jardinnet by 10 p. m., in liaison with the 77th Division, but did not secure contact with the 3d Battalion, 111th Infantry, to the right. The right of the 112th Infantry was not in contact with the left of the 109th Infantry. [23, 264, 267, 268, 269]

At 1 a. m., September 27, the I Corps issued orders for an advance to the combined army first objective at 5:30 a. m. Divisions were to advance to the combined army first-phase line, which ran generally from north to south between Fléville and Apremont, without regard to progress made by those to the right or left. Subsequent orders were to be issued for the advance beyond the combined army first-phase line. The I Corps further ordered that the artillery of the divisions be brought forward to support the infantry. It also directed that the leading battalions advance boldly, and that all mopping up be left to units in rear. No field orders based on the corps order were issued by the 28th Division or by either of its brigades. [270] Sept. 27

On the extreme right, the 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, supported by tanks, attacked from its positions on the plateau north of Varennes about 5:40 a. m. The 2d Battalion was in support, and the 3d Battalion in reserve. The reserve battalion provided combat liaison to the right; there was no direct combat liaison with the 109th Infantry to the left. About 8 a. m. a position about 300 meters north of Montblainville was reached, where the advance was held up by heavy machine-gun fire from the northwest. The 2d Battalion went into line to the left of the 1st Battalion, and Company K was put in as left-flank combat liaison unit to the left rear of the 2d Battalion. A local counterattack was broken up at 11:30 a. m., and by 3 p. m. positions north, west and southwest of Montblainville were consolidated, in contact east of Montblainville with the 35th Division. No further advance was made during the day by the 110th Infantry. The positions held extended from the Aire, on the Montblainville—Baulny road, in a general westerly direction for about 300 meters north of Montblainville, thence to the south around the north and west edges of the town, to the Montblainville—Camp de Bouzon road. Liaison was secured with the 109th Infantry, which moved up southwest of the town. [23, 257, 267, 271]

In the right center, the 109th Infantry attempted to advance during the early morning, but was held up by machine-gun fire from the northwest. About noon its 1st Battalion moved

north to Montblainville and extended the line of the 110th Infantry to the southwest. By dusk it had placed the 1st and 3d Battalions in line, and the 2d Battalion in support in Montblainville. The line held was south of and about 200 meters distant from the Montblainville—Camp de Bouzon road, and extended southwest about 500 meters from the western outskirts of Montblainville, with no front-line liaison to the left. [23, 267, 271]

In the left center, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 112th Infantry, attacked around the eastern slopes of Cote des Perrieres at daybreak, in conjunction with the 2d Battalion, which attacked in the direction of Champ Mahaut. The attack on the right advanced about 1 kilometer, but machine-gun fire was so intense that about 4 p. m. the 1st and 3d Battalions were withdrawn to the positions of the night of September 26–27, south of Cote des Perrieres. The 2d Battalion, on the left, had been held up by fire from Champ Mahaut, and had made no appreciable gains during the day. About this time the 1st and 3d Battalions 112th Infantry, were withdrawn from the line, leaving the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, to cover the withdrawal. The battalion extended its lines to the right and covered the regimental zone of action. [23, 267, 269, 273]

On the extreme left, the 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, attacked at 6:15 a. m. and came up to the left of the 3d Battalion, 111th Infantry. These two battalions supported the attack of the 112th Infantry at daybreak, September 27. They participated during the late morning and about noon in the attempts to advance north past Cote des Perrieres and Champ Mahaut, but only succeeded in advancing the extreme left of the line as far as Carrefour des Meurissons, where contact was maintained with the 77th Division. In the zone of action of the 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, the line was not held exactly along the Cote des Perrieres—Carrefour des Meurissons road, but was withdrawn to the German trenches south of the road, to permit friendly artillery to fire north of the road. The line of the 56th Infantry Brigade was held from right to left by the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry; 3d Battalion, 111th Infantry; and 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, and extended along the southern

slope of Cote des Perrieres, thence up the slope south of Champ Mahaut and across the high ground for about 600 meters to the vicinity of Carrefour des Meurissons. There was no front-line contact with the 109th Infantry to the right. Company I, 112th Infantry, having advanced with troops of the 77th Division to the vicinity of Carrefour des Meurissons and established liaison with the 111th Infantry, rejoined its battalion. [23, 274, 275, 276]

At 3:15 p. m. the 28th Division ordered the 2d and 3d Battalions, 111th Infantry, to move to the American Army objective, northeast of Pont à l'Aune, and form in depth with one battalion in line and one in support. No coordinated advance was attempted at this time. Companies B and D, 111th Infantry, from division reserve in Varennes, were sent as outposts to the eastern edge of the Argonne Forest west of Varennes, and held this position for the night of September 27-28 with no contact to either flank. [267, 274]

During the night of September 27-28 the 1st and 3d Battalions, 112th Infantry, moved northward via Varennes and took up positions for attack in the valley south of Montblainville. [273]

At 11 p. m. the I Corps ordered that the advance to the combined army first objective be resumed at 5:30 a. m., September 28. Objectives and missions were unchanged. [277]

The 28th Division notified its troops at 11:50 p. m., September 27, of the provisions of this field order. [278]

On the right, the 110th Infantry attacked about 6:30 a. m. after a 1-hour artillery preparation, with the 3d Battalion leading, the 2d Battalion in support and the 1st Battalion in reserve. The advance was slow during the morning, but by 11:30 a. m. the leading battalion was approaching the ravine west of Baulny. It was advancing on the plateau and between the high ground and the Aire. During the afternoon the 2d Battalion was put to the right of the 3d Battalion and advanced nearly to the southern edge of Apremont. Later it was switched to the left of the 3d Battalion, where, about 4 p. m., the 1st Battalion passed through it. The 2d Battalion, in conjunction with units of the 1st Battalion, captured Apremont. The 3d

Sept. 28

Battalion continued to the north of the town and reached positions along the Apremont—le Ménil Ferme road, extending to the vicinity of the ravine 500 meters northwest of Apremont. The line for the night was consolidated with the 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, holding the front line from the vicinity of the station, where it was in liaison with the 35th Division, northwest along the Apremont—le Ménil Ferme road to the ravine northwest of the town. It was in contact with the right element of the 109th Infantry at the mouth of this ravine. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 110th Infantry, remained in support in Apremont and in the vicinity of the town. [23, 257, 267, 271, 279]

The intermingled 1st and 2d Battalions, 109th Infantry, attacked about 6:30 a. m. to the left of the 110th Infantry. These troops received heavy machine-gun fire during their advance throughout the day, but after the taking of Apremont by the 110th Infantry, moved to a position along the ravine to the west of the town and consolidated a line facing west. They extended the line of the 110th Infantry to the south a distance of about 500 meters. The 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, was in support throughout the day. [23, 280, 281]

The 1st and 3d Battalions, 112th Infantry, supported by machine guns, attacked about 6 a. m. from positions in the ravine south of Montblainville, with the mission of establishing a line on the military crest of Le Chene Tondu ridge. The advance skirted the eastern edge of Bois de Bouzon, and by 7:50 a. m. was held up by machine-gun fire from Le Chene Tondu and the ridge south of it. By 10:40 a. m. an advance had been made with difficulty to a position about 500 meters south of and parallel to the narrow-gauge railroad north of Bois de Bouzon. At 1:40 p.m. the 28th Division ordered the 112th Infantry to advance north along the eastern edge of the Argonne Forest until opposite the positions of the 55th Infantry Brigade, and then to attack in conjunction with that brigade. During the afternoon the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, having moved from its position on Cote des Perrieres, joined the regiment, and the three battalions of the 112th Infantry reached the base of Le Chene Tondu. A combined attack of the whole regi-

ment, with a preparatory machine-gun barrage and machine-gun support during the advance, was planned for 4 p. m. This attack succeeded in reaching the summit of the hill between 6 and 7 p. m., and positions were consolidated with the 3d, 1st and 2d Battalions from right to left, extending from the north-eastern slopes of Le Chene Tondu along the southern edge of the plateau, and then curving to the southwest to the Apremont—le Chene Tondu road, near which point the line ended. There was a gap of about 600 meters between the positions of the intermingled 1st and 3d Battalions, 112th Infantry, on the eastern end of the ridge, and the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, on the left of the line. There was no front-line liaison to the right or left. [23, 256, 267, 269, 282, 283, 284]

At 3:52 a. m. the 28th Division, in a field message, notified the 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, then in division reserve, that the barrage was to start at 5:30 a. m., and that the division was to continue the advance from Montblainville. The 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, was ordered to join as soon as possible on the army objective, keeping touch with the 77th Division to the left. It was understood that the 3d Battalion, 111th Infantry, was also to be guided by these orders, and these two battalions attacked in conjunction with the 77th Division about 6:30 a. m. No advance was made during the morning against the enemy holding on a general east and west line through Abri St. Louis. About 2:30 p. m. the 111th Infantry was ordered by the 28th Division to move to the vicinity of Montblainville. The 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, moved to a position near the town, but the 3d Battalion continued its northward movement and about 7 p. m. reached the vicinity of the narrow-gauge railroad running southwest from Camp de Bouzon. By 10:20 p. m. a line was established for the night along the railroad, with portions of Companies I, M and L in line and K in close support, extending from the vicinity of Camp de Bouzon to the vicinity of the crossroads about 1 kilometer to the southwest. There was no front-line liaison to the right or left, the 77th Division not having advanced past the Varennes—Abri du Crochet road. [23, 256, 267, 285, 286]

At 11:50 p. m. the 28th Division ordered the 3d Battalion,

111th Infantry, to proceed to Montblainville, but the movement was not in progress before midnight. [267]

At 11 p. m. the I Corps announced a continuation of the attack at 5:30 a. m., September 29. Each division was to advance without regard to the progress of the divisions to the right and left. The 28th Division issued orders at 11:15 p. m., announcing that the enemy was in retreat and was holding his front with covering detachments. The 55th Infantry Brigade was ordered to attack on the right, supported by accompanying artillery and tanks; the 56th Infantry Brigade, less the 111th Infantry in division reserve, was to attack on the left, using strong mopping-up parties to clear the woods as it advanced. The artillery was to place searching fire and fire of destruction on selected areas during the night of September 28-29 and during the advance of the infantry on September 29. Each brigade was assigned a battalion of field artillery. [287, 288]

Sept. 29 On the extreme right, the 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, attacked at 5:30 a. m. and advanced without serious difficulty to the vicinity of Dépôt de Munitions and Le Ménéil Ferme. The 109th Infantry, which was to have attacked to the left of the 110th, did not move out as scheduled, but after the 110th Infantry had advanced it was ordered to attack at 7:20 a. m. with tank support. The tanks were delayed in reporting, and the attacking troops had not passed Apremont by 10:30 a. m. About this time the enemy launched a counterattack against the 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, which that battalion repulsed. Hostile infantry which approached Apremont from the west and northwest was driven to the westward by the 2d Battalion, 110th Infantry, supported by tanks. Being unsupported on either flank, the 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, was withdrawn about 3 p. m. to the positions of the night of September 28-29. The 2d Battalion, 109th Infantry, held the left of the line of the 55th Infantry Brigade in the same position as on the previous night. [23, 256, 289, 290, 291]

At 5:50 p. m. the 28th Division ordered the 55th Infantry Brigade to organize Apremont as a strongpoint, extending the line generally down the bluff and establishing contact with the left of the 35th Division. The line was to be extended to the

left by a series of strongpoints and contact established with the 56th Infantry Brigade. [23, 267]

About 8 p. m. the enemy launched another counterattack from the north, which succeeded in penetrating the front lines of the 55th Infantry Brigade and driving its troops to the west of Apremont. A portion of the troops driven from the advanced lines was assembled south of the town near point 182. Under command of the 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, a reorganization was quickly made and a counterattack launched from Apremont, which cleared the enemy out of the former front lines. By 10 p. m. the lines of September 28-29 were again held by the 28th Division. Following the repulse of the hostile counterattack, the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry, relieved the 1st Battalion. The lines around Apremont were held by the 3d Battalion and elements of the 109th Infantry. There was no front-line liaison to either flank, although machine-gun and rifle support was furnished the 35th Division to the right by the establishment of strongpoints on the bluffs west of the river from Apremont to opposite Baulny. [23, 289, 291, 292, 293]

The 1st and 3d Battalions, 112th Infantry, attempted to gain the northeastern portion of Le Chene Tondu by an encircling movement from the east during the early morning, but were unable to advance past the buildings on the northeastern slope. The enemy fire was so heavy that these organizations were forced to withdraw to the valley to the south of the hill about 10:30 a. m. About this time the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, which had attacked on the left, but not in conjunction with the remainder of the regiment, was also driven back from positions on the hill. Arrangements were made to send forward the 1st and 2d Battalions, 111th Infantry, from the vicinity of Montblainville to reinforce the 112th Infantry. These battalions arrived in the valley south of Le Chene Tondu in time to take part in an attack at 4:30 p. m. The 2d and 1st Battalions, 111th Infantry, from right to left, supported by the 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry, passed through the lines of the 112th Infantry and regained the positions on Le Chene Tondu before dark. The 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, on the extreme right, advanced the line about 300 meters to include a German hos-

pital on the eastern summit of the hill. The line then extended southwest to the line held by the 112th Infantry on the night of September 28-29. There was liaison to the left with the 1st Battalion, 111th Infantry. The 56th Infantry Brigade had no front-line liaison to the right or left. [23, 267, 269, 294, 295, 296]

During the night of September 29-30 the line of the 28th Division was considerably in advance of the front lines of the divisions to its flanks. The 35th Division was in position on the ridge northeast of Baulny, and the 77th Division south of Pont à l'Aune. [297, 298]

Sept. 30 At 1 a. m. the I Corps issued field orders directing its divisions to organize for defense a line which, in the zone of the 28th Division, was generally, Apremont—le Chene Tondu—Pont à l'Aune, with an outpost zone extending 2 kilometers in advance of the line of resistance. Contact was to be maintained with the enemy by deep patrolling. Reorganization of units was to be expedited. [299]

During the morning the 110th Infantry, assisted by supporting machine guns, repulsed enemy attempts to advance in the vicinity of L'Espérance. Apremont was organized during the day with four strongpoints, echeloned in depth. Strongpoint No. 1 was located in the cemetery on the ridge north of Apremont; No. 2 was situated about 400 meters to the left, in the large gravel pit; No. 3 was in the vicinity of crossroads 9777; No. 4 was in the vicinity of Forge south of the town, prepared to fire over and to the right of No. 1. These strongpoints were garrisoned with the following troops: No. 1, Companies I and K, 110th Infantry; No. 2, Company E, 110th Infantry, and a platoon of the 307th Engineers, 82d Division; No. 3, Company F, 109th Infantry; No. 4, Companies E, I and L, 109th Infantry. The remainder of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 109th Infantry, was in support in the vicinity of Apremont. The 1st Battalions of both the 109th and 110th Infantry Regiments, plus the remainder of the 2d Battalion, 110th Infantry, were in reserve in the German trenches northwest of Montblainville. Portions of the 107th Machine-Gun Battalion in the vicinity of Forge, were in position to assist the 35th Division by fire across its front. [267, 289, 300]

The 327th Infantry, 82d Division, which had moved by battalions to Varennes in reserve of the 28th Division on September 29, was moved in the late morning of September 30 to the vicinity of Baulny, and reinforced the line of the 35th Division on the ridge to the northeast of that town. This regiment was relieved during the night of September 30–October 1, when the 1st Division relieved the 35th Division. The 327th Infantry reverted from reserve of the 28th Division to the 82d Division on October 3. [256, 302]

The remainder of the 111th Infantry was relieved from division reserve on September 30. Its 2d and 1st Battalions, from right to left, continued to hold the line of the night of September 29–30 on Le Chene Tondu, and the 3d Battalion moved from the vicinity of Montblainville to the ravine south of Le Chene Tondu. The 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry, continued in support of the right of the line. The 1st Battalion, 111th Infantry, extended to the left during the day and secured contact with the 77th Division in the vicinity of the divisional left boundary, north of Pont à l'Aune. There was no front-line liaison between the two brigades of the division. [23, 267, 303]

At 9 p. m. the I Corps issued orders announcing that the First Army would continue to advance upon receipt of later orders. Pending this further advance, the 28th Division was to organize for defense a line extending generally through Montblainville, Camp de Bouzon and Pont à l'Aune. The existing outpost line was to be held and close contact maintained with the enemy. [304]

The 1st Division relieved the 35th Division during the night of September 30–October 1. On October 1 the former advanced its left to the road L'Espérance—Chaudron Ferme, and there established liaison with the 28th Division. [23, 305, 306, 307] Oct. 1

In the zone of action of the 55th Infantry Brigade the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry, with the 1st Battalion in support, was ordered to advance about 2 kilometers on the morning of October 1 to improve the outpost position. The attack was to be made at 6:30 a. m. It was to follow a half-hour artillery preparation, supported by machine guns of the 107th and 108th

Machine-Gun Battalions and of the 109th Infantry, and nine tanks. At 5:30 a. m., however, the enemy put down a heavy standing barrage, and attacked in force about 5:45 a. m. from Bois de Taille l'Abbé. As soon as the hostile barrage lifted, the tanks moved forward ahead of the infantry. In the engagement that ensued, the tanks assisted in driving the enemy from the field and by 8:20 a. m. the attack was definitely repulsed, and the enemy driven back into Bois de Taille l'Abbé. [23, 257, 267, 289]

In the zone of action of the 56th Infantry Brigade, it was planned that the 112th Infantry, with the 3d Battalion in the assault echelon and the 2d Battalion in support, would attack around the eastern nose of Le Chene Tondu on the morning of the 1st. The attack was to be made in conjunction with that of the 111th Infantry to the left. Part of the same hostile attack that fell on the 55th Infantry Brigade also struck the 56th Infantry Brigade, and as a result the attack by the 112th Infantry did not get started. The advanced lines of the 112th Infantry were withdrawn later in the day to the ravine south of the ridge. The 3d Battalion, 111th Infantry, was placed between the 1st and 2d Battalions of the regiment to strengthen the line. During the afternoon the 111th Infantry attacked and all three battalions made gains, the line being consolidated for the night by the 2d, 3d and 1st Battalions, from right to left, about 100 meters south of the main Apremont—le Chene Tondu road, and crossing the Le Chene Tondu—Pont à l'Aune road about 300 meters southwest of the cemetery. It joined the line of the 77th Division in the vicinity of the divisional left boundary. There was no front-line contact to the right with the 55th Infantry Brigade. [23, 267, 308]

During the evening the 109th Infantry took over the front from the 110th Infantry on the right of the division, along the lines held since September 28, placing the 1st and 2d Battalions in line. The 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, was in support in Apremont, and the 110th Infantry went into reserve in the two ravines south of the town. [23, 223, 289]

At 5 p. m. the I Corps issued field orders outlining an attack to be made in the near future. The objective assigned for the corps, in the zone of action of the 28th Division, was the line, Cote 180 (incl.)—Cote 244 (incl.)—crossroads 1 kilometer west of Cote 244. The advance to the objective was to be made without reference to flank divisions. The 28th Division was directed to be ready to advance, upon receipt of orders, from the objective in the existing zone of action at H plus 5 hours. A later memorandum provided that the right boundary for the attack should coincide with the left boundary of the 1st Division, the Baulny—Fléville road. A rolling barrage, coordinated with that of the 1st Division to the right, was to precede the infantry. [310]

During the morning of October 2, patrols from Companies K and L, 109th Infantry, were sent forward under cover of the riverbank near Apremont to reconnoiter Châtel-Chéhéry and Hill 223. The line, La Forge, northwest of Apremont—Châtel-Chéhéry, was reached by some of these patrols shortly before noon and Cote 180 later in the day. Those reaching Cote 180 were captured. The advance toward Châtel-Chéhéry was stopped by machine-gun fire from positions near the town. The lines of the 55th Infantry Brigade were not changed on this date. There was liaison to the right with the 1st Division, but none to the left with the 56th Infantry Brigade. [23, 267, 289, 311, 312] Oct. 2

On the left of the division, the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, supported by smoke and thermite bombs, attacked the center of the fortified enemy positions on Le Chene Tondu early in the morning, but found the enemy holding a continuous line which barred any advance. The 1st and 3d Battalions attempted an encircling movement about 7:30 a. m. to the east of Le Chene Tondu, between the lines of the 55th and 56th Infantry Brigades, but could make no advance, and were forced to retire to the ravine south of the hill, where they were later joined by the 2d Battalion. Under division orders, the 1st and 3d Battalions moved to Apremont, as part of a plan to attack westward from that town in conjunction with the 55th Infantry Brigade.

However, about 3:15 p. m. they received orders to return to the former positions in the ravine south of Le Chene Tondu, and by about 5 p. m. had taken up the positions ordered. [23, 267, 269, 313, 314]

The 111th Infantry, supported by the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, did not make any concerted attacks during the day. It maintained contact with the 77th Division. [23, 315, 316]

Oct. 3 There were no general attacks on October 3. During the night of October 2-3 gassing of hostile rear areas was attempted. This provoked retaliatory artillery fire from the enemy. Local efforts were made to improve the line of the 56th Infantry Brigade, but no gains were made. The lines held at midnight were the same as those held on October 2. There was no front-line liaison with the 1st Division to the right, although patrols from that division were active in the area east of the Aire River. Contact was maintained with the 77th Division to the left at the same point as during the night of October 2-3. [256, 267]

During the day the 28th Division issued field orders which directed that the general attack prescribed by corps field orders of October 1 would be made at 5:25 a. m., October 4. The division designated Cote 180, Hill 223 and Cote 244 as objectives for the 56th Infantry Brigade, which was ordered to make the main attack. The 55th Infantry Brigade was to assist the 56th Infantry Brigade. The right boundary of the division was designated as the Baulny—Fléville road. The left boundary was not changed. [317, 318]

A rolling barrage, commencing at the hour of attack, was to be preceded by a deep standing barrage of five minutes duration. Two 75-mm guns were attached to each leading infantry battalion. One company of tanks was attached to the 55th Infantry Brigade. Each brigade was to furnish one battalion of infantry to the division reserve, and was responsible for inter-brigade combat liaison. Brigades were also responsible for combat liaison with flank divisions, both of which were to attack in conjunction with the 28th Division. [317]

The order of battle of the leading units on the morning of October 4 was to be as follows:

56TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

112th Infantry 111th Infantry
2d Battalion 1st-3d-2d Bns

55TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

109th Infantry 110th Infantry
3d Battalion 2d Battalion
2d Battalion 3d Battalion

[257, 269, 289, 319]

The 55th Infantry Brigade directed the 110th Infantry, east of the Aire, to advance in conjunction with the 1st Division. The 109th Infantry, west of the Aire, was to keep to the low ground between the river and the railroad. [289]

Enemy counteroffensive artillery fire about 5:30 a. m., October 4, slowed up the beginning of the attack. The 110th Infantry crossed the Aire and attacked about 5:30 a. m. with its right on the Baulny—Fléville road, in conjunction with the 1st Division. About 9:45 a. m. its 2d Battalion had reached a position parallel to the Ferme des Granges—la Forge road, and about 400 meters south of it, where it was held up for about two hours by machine-gun fire from La Forge. In the afternoon the 3d Battalion advanced to the left toward La Forge with the mission of taking Cote 180, while the 2d Battalion was able to move around La Forge and advance past Ferme des Granges, Abbatiale Ferme, Chéhéry, Pleinchamp Ferme, and reach the Aire to the east of Cote 180. Machine-gun fire from both La Forge and Châtel-Chéhéry stopped the advance of the 3d Battalion, which then formed a line from the vicinity of Ferme des Granges, thence southwest to the Aire opposite Dépôt de Munitions. By 7 p. m. the 2d Battalion had extended its right so as to gain contact with the 1st Division on the ridge south of Fléville, and was consolidating a position from that point southwest to the Aire, opposite Cote 180. Its line extended southeast to its junction with the line of the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry, on the Ferme des Granges—la Forge road. The 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry, was in liaison with the 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, which after dark crossed at the dam (Barrage) and formed a line south of La Forge on the east bank of the Aire. During the afternoon the 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, crossed the Aire at Apremont and took up a position in reserve to the northwest of Ferme des Granges.

Oct. 4

These lines were held for the night. [23, 257, 267, 292, 320]

On the left of the 55th Infantry Brigade, the 109th Infantry had designated its 3d Battalion to pass through the 2d Battalion and attack along the west bank of the Aire. There was some delay because of the hostile artillery counterpreparation, but about 7 a. m. the 3d Battalion attacked with the assistance of tanks. By 9:45 a. m. a line had been reached to the east of the southern limits of Châtel-Chéhéry, in the neighborhood of Dépôt de Munitions. Machine-gun fire from La Forge and Châtel-Chéhéry stopped the advance at this point, and two of the tanks were disabled by artillery fire. About noon the tanks were forced to withdraw. About 1 p. m., following an artillery preparation, another advance was attempted. Elements of the attacking units reached the bridge on the road leading to La Forge, but the ground gained could not be held, and a line was formed facing west in the vicinity of Dépôt de Munitions. Shortly after dark the 3d Battalion was withdrawn from this position and crossed the Aire to the east bank at the dam, forming a line south of that of the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry, and became a part of the front line. Liaison was maintained to the right with the 110th Infantry, and to the left with the 2d Battalion, 109th Infantry, in the former positions northwest of Apremont. Neither the 1st nor the 2d Battalion, 109th Infantry, moved from its position in the vicinity of Apremont during the day. The 2d Battalion maintained liaison with the right of the 56th Infantry Brigade. [23, 267, 283, 289]

At the time scheduled for the attack, the 111th Infantry continued to hold the front line, with all three battalions in line. The 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, attacked at 5:25 a. m. between the positions of the 111th Infantry and the 77th Division, and succeeded in reaching the crest of the ridge to the immediate front, but could not advance farther. During the morning the 28th Division ordered the 56th Infantry Brigade to make another attack about noon with tank and artillery assistance. The brigade was not ready to attack until about 3 p. m., when an unsuccessful attempt was made to advance. During the afternoon the 1st and 3d Battalions, 112th Infantry, were moved to the west and up the slopes of Le Chene Tondeu,

behind the 2d Battalion, which during the day had taken up positions generally along and somewhat to the west of the narrow-gauge railroad crossing the western portion of Le Chene Tendu. The left of this line was refused to maintain contact with the 77th Division about 700 meters southeast of La Viergette. [23, 267, 269, 319]

During the afternoon the 3d Battalion, 111th Infantry, was moved from the center of the line to the right of the 2d Battalion, and took position there, closing the gap between the 55th and 56th Infantry Brigades by patrols. At midnight the line of the 56th Infantry Brigade was held, from right to left, by the 3d, 2d and 1st Battalions, 111th Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry. [23]

The I Corps issued field orders at 11 p. m. directing a continuation of the attack at 6:30 a. m., October 5, making no changes in objectives, boundaries or dispositions. The 28th Division, in field messages issued at 11:05 p. m., notified its brigades of the continuation of the attack. Upon reaching the combined army first objective, the position was to be organized in depth, and vigorous exploitation pushed 2 kilometers to the front to secure a line of observation. [267, 322]

On the right of the division, adjustment and consolidation of the line was continued on October 5. The 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, occupied La Forge, which was evacuated by the enemy during the night of October 4-5. To the north of La Forge, the line was extended to the Aire, opposite Cote 180, where it joined the line of the night of October 4-5. The remainder of the line to the east of the Aire was unchanged. West of the Aire the 2d Battalion, 109th Infantry, sent patrols into Bois de Taille l'Abbé to reconnoiter Châtel-Chéhéry. It was found that this town, Hill 223 and Cote 244 were held in force by the enemy. No change occurred in this portion of the line during the day. [23, 267, 289, 323] Oct. 5

On the left of the division, the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, supported by the 1st and 3d Battalions, was ordered to attack to the northwest from its positions between the 111th Infantry and the 77th Division. Just prior to 9 a. m., when this attack was to have commenced, the regiment was ordered to expedite

a movement to the vicinity of Apremont. The 1st and 3d Battalions moved out shortly thereafter. The 2d Battalion disengaged itself and followed, arriving in the vicinity of Apremont about 5 p. m., where it joined the remainder of the regiment. [23, 267, 269, 324]

This movement was for the purpose of placing the regiment in position to launch an attack westward on Châtel-Chéhéry and Cote 244 from the zone of the 55th Infantry Brigade during the night of October 5-6. Reconnaissance patrols of the 112th Infantry and of the 2d Battalion, 109th Infantry, failed to return in time to enable the attack to be made as planned. The 112th Infantry remained in support of the 55th Infantry Brigade during the night. [267, 269]

No change in the line occurred on the 5th in the zone of action of the 56th Infantry Brigade, except that the portion of the line to the left of the 111th Infantry, vacated by the withdrawal of the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, was not reoccupied by the former. Contact was maintained to both flanks as before. [267, 324]

At midnight, October 5, the I Corps issued field orders for the continuation of organization of the line of resistance, and for the attack of the 28th Division. The latter was to attack at 8 a. m., with the mission of capturing and holding Cote 244 and the crest of the ridge to the south to include Le Chene Tondu. The 1st Division was to hold its existing line, south of Fléville. The 77th Division was to support the attack of the 28th Division on Le Chene Tondu. The entire corps was to be prepared to resume the attack on October 7. [325]

The 28th Division issued no formal field orders covering the provisions of the corps order. [326]

Oct. 6 No attacks were made in the zone of the 55th Infantry Brigade on the 6th. Patrols of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 109th Infantry, reconnoitered toward Châtel-Chéhéry during the morning, reporting the enemy present in force in the town. The 112th Infantry, in support positions in the vicinity of Apremont, sent patrols toward Châtel-Chéhéry. A local attack planned for this regiment during the night of October 6-7 was abandoned upon receipt of orders for the attack of October 7. [256, 267, 289]

No action occurred on the remainder of the divisional front. Both flanks continued to maintain contact with the divisions to the right and left. [267, 327]

By October 6 the First Army had made an advance of approximately 12 kilometers, and was confronted by strong enemy positions on the heights of Cunel, the heights of Romagne and the eastern edge of the Argonne Forest in the vicinity of Châtel-Chéhéry and Cornay. In order to reduce the positions about Cornay and Châtel-Chéhéry and force evacuation of those confronting the 77th Division in the Argonne Forest, the First Army ordered the I Corps to attack westward on October 7. At the same time, the right corps of the French Fourth Army was to advance against the forest in a northeasterly direction through Lançon, 6 kilometers west of Châtel-Chéhéry. [237, 328]

The I Corps issued field orders at 6 p. m., October 6, directing that the attack be launched at 5 a. m., October 7, on the front then held by the 28th Division. Two objectives were established as follows:

First objective: Fléville (excl.)—Cornay (incl.)—Hill 223 (incl.)—Cote 244—cemetery on Le Chene Tondu.

Corps objective: Fléville (excl.)—Cornay (incl.)—point 151, 500 meters west of Cornay—Hill 263—head of ravine 2 kilometers west of Hill 223—la Viergette.

Divisions were to advance to the first objective without regard to the progress of the divisions to the right or left, and be prepared to advance to the corps objective three hours after the attack was launched. The corps objective was to be organized for defense and held at all costs. A new right boundary was assigned to the 28th Division, the line, La Forge—chateau in Châtel-Chéhéry. The 82d Division was directed to relieve the troops of the 28th Division north of the new boundary before midnight, October 6, and attack westward. The 28th Division was to advance to the left of the 82d. The 1st Division, on the right of the corps, was to hold its positions and continue exploitation. The 77th Division, on the left of the corps, was to hold its positions and be prepared to advance on receipt of orders. [328]

In order to obtain the advantage of surprise, the corps directed that great care would be taken to conceal preparatory dispositions from the enemy, and that the corps artillery would continue its normal interdiction fire. The fire of the division artillery of the 28th and 82d Divisions was to be coordinated under the chief of corps artillery. There was to be no artillery preparation, but the attack was to be covered by a rolling barrage, and artillery fire concentrated on known enemy positions as the advance progressed. Two 75-mm guns were attached to each leading infantry battalion as accompanying guns. One company of tanks was to operate with the 28th Division. The corps also directed that front-line infantry battalions would not be reinforced, but would be passed through by support battalions when definitely slowed down by enemy resistance. [328]

The 28th Division issued its attack order based on that of the corps. The 55th Infantry Brigade, reinforced by the 112th Infantry, was ordered to attack westward, using the bank of the Aire as a line of departure, with a right boundary extending west through La Forge (excl.)—Hill 223 (excl.), and a left boundary through Apremont (excl.)—ridge 2 kilometers west of Hill 223. The objectives were to be the portions of those assigned by the I Corps which lay within these boundaries. [267, 329]

One battalion of the 55th Infantry Brigade was to be left to hold Apremont, and after the first objective had been taken, Bois de Taille l'Abbé was to be mopped up by detachments of the brigade in conjunction with a detachment from the 56th Infantry Brigade. The 56th Infantry Brigade, less the 112th Infantry and one battalion, 111th Infantry, in division reserve, was to hold Le Chene Tondu, and assist in mopping up Bois de Taille l'Abbé. A standing barrage 200 meters deep was to be put down at 4:30 a. m. on the first objective. This would become a rolling barrage at 5 a. m. The 55th Infantry Brigade was to designate combat-liaison groups to both flanks, each to consist of one company of infantry and one machine-gun platoon. [329]

Following receipt of this order, the 56th Infantry Brigade directed that the brigade, less the 112th Infantry, would main-

tain close liaison with flanking units and continue to mop up Le Chene Tondou. The 112th Infantry was ordered to report to the 55th Infantry Brigade. The 3d Battalion, 111th Infantry, was assigned as division reserve to remain in the vicinity of Care Dépôt in the ravine of Ruisseau de Vervaux. [330]

The 55th Infantry Brigade's formation for the attack was as follows:

112th Infantry
3d Battalion
1st Battalion
2d Battalion

110th Infantry
3d Battalion
2d Battalion
1st Battalion

[257, 331]

During the night of October 6-7 dispositions were made for the attack. The 103d Engineers built a bridge across the Aire at La Forge. The 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, moved across this bridge to cover the crossing of the 110th Infantry for the attack, and took up a position along the railroad west of the Aire. The attacking forces of the 110th Infantry crossed the river before midnight, October 6, and took up positions south of the bridge and under cover of the riverbank. The 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, was ordered to cover the crossing of the 82d Division prior to the attack and to remain in position until Châtel-Chéhéry was taken, when it was to move up to the town as the reserve of the 55th Infantry Brigade. The 112th Infantry took up positions in readiness along the river, just east of Apremont. The 108th Machine-Gun Battalion remained in place in the vicinity of Chéhéry and Pleinchamp Ferme to cover what now had become the right rear of the 28th Division. [23, 256, 289]

The plan for the attack provided that the 110th Infantry would attack on the right, in conjunction with the 82d Division. The 108th Machine-Gun Battalion was to support the 110th Infantry after passage of lines by the 82d Division. The 112th Infantry was to attack to the left of the 110th Infantry from the vicinity of Apremont, with Cote 244 as its objective. [257, 269, 289]

For October 7, the 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, was to con-

tinue its mission of October 6; the 2d Battalion of the regiment was to mop up the northern edge of Bois de Taille l'Abbé in conjunction with detachments of the 56th Infantry Brigade, and the 1st Battalion was to man the strongpoints of Apremont. [289, 331]

The 3d Battalion, 111th Infantry, was assigned as division reserve, and the 1st and 2d Battalions were directed to hold Le Chene Tondu until further orders. [289, 333]

Oct. 7 [289] The attack commenced as scheduled at 5 a. m., October 7.

On the right, the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, reached Châtel-Chéhéry about 6 a. m. Movement continued toward the hills to the west of the town, under heavy fire, and by 8:30 a. m. the 110th Infantry had taken the hill in its zone of action. The 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, was immediately to the south on the slopes of Cote 244. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 112th Infantry, were moved to the right through the town, and the 1st Battalion entered the line to the right of the 3d Battalion, which was held up by machine-gun fire from the top of the hill. The 2d Battalion was withdrawn to support. The left regiment of the 82d Division had not yet taken Hill 223, and during the morning the 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, from brigade reserve, was sent to protect the right of the 110th Infantry and occupy this hill until the arrival of the 82d Division. [267, 289, 331]

By 12:35 p. m. the 82d Division had taken a position on the top of Hill 223, and the 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, was withdrawn to Châtel-Chéhéry. About this time the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, in support, was sent to the southwest to flank the hostile machine-gun resistance on Cote 244. The 110th Infantry continued to hold its positions on the hill between Hill 223 and Cote 244, with its 3d Battalion in the front line and its 1st and 2d Battalions in support in Châtel-Chéhéry. [23, 267, 289]

In the meantime the 2d Battalion, 109th Infantry, had passed Le Ménil Ferme during the morning, and was mopping up the northern edge of Bois de Taille l'Abbé, advancing toward the crossroads near the head of La Pellette ravine. The attack

toward Châtel-Chéhéry caused the withdrawal of the German 2d Landwehr Division, facing the 111th Infantry on Le Chene Tondu, to a line slightly west of Cote 244, including the crossroads 1 kilometer west of the hill, and generally paralleling the narrow-gauge railroad running west from Le Ménil Ferme to a position about 600 meters south of the crossroads. This withdrawal of the 2d Landwehr Division also caused the subsequent withdrawal of the left of the German 76th Reserve Division, which faced the right of the 77th Division. These withdrawals left no enemy in force facing the front of the 111th Infantry and the right of the 77th Division. [23, 267, 334, 335]

At 9:25 a. m. the 28th Division ordered the 56th Infantry Brigade to take La Viergette, and shortly thereafter, the 3d Battalion, 111th Infantry, from division reserve, was ordered to garrison and hold Le Chene Tondu. This was done during the morning. The 111th Infantry, less the 3d Battalion, moved up the road running north to La Viergette with the 2d Battalion leading, arriving at La Viergette about 12:30 p. m. [23, 267]

At 2 p. m. the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, was reported as being at the crossroads 1,200 meters southwest of the church in Châtel-Chéhéry, but this information was later found to be in error, the crossroads near the head of La Pellette ravine being the actual position of the battalion. During the afternoon the head of the column of the 111th Infantry also reached this position. A line for the night was formed about 300 meters north of the crossroads and extending to the divisional left boundary at the point where it crossed the narrow-gauge railroad. From the La Viergette road, the line extended northeast along the eastern crest of Cote 244, thence across the crest of the intermediate hill to its junction with the 82d Division on Hill 223. The 77th Division, which had also moved forward during the afternoon, was in contact with the 111th Infantry. The 2d Battalion, 109th Infantry, was withdrawn from the line during the night, and went into support in Châtel-Chéhéry. [23, 267, 289, 336]

During the afternoon, orders were sent to the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, and 2d Battalion, 109th Infantry, to reach the high ground 2 kilometers west of

Hill 223. This was found to be impossible, owing to strong enemy resistance to the southwest and west. [267, 289]

Further orders sent at 11:30 p. m., to the 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry, by the 55th Infantry Brigade, under division instructions, to advance to the high ground west of Châtel-Chéhéry were not acted upon that night. In the zone of action of the 56th Infantry Brigade, the line was held for the night by the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, southwest from Cote 244 to its junction with the 77th Division along the narrow-gauge railroad on the divisional left boundary. There was much intermingling of elements within the battalion. [23, 289]

At 10:30 p. m. the I Corps issued field orders for a resumption of the attack at 6 a. m., October 8, with the 82d, 28th and 77th Divisions from right to left. The 1st Division had passed to the V Corps at 5 p. m., October 7. The objective was a general line, Cornay—la Besogne. The right boundary of the 28th Division was established as the line, Hill 223 (excl.)—point on railroad 1 kilometer southwest of Pylône—thence generally north to Marcq (incl.). The left boundary was the line, La Viergette—point on ridge 2 kilometers south of La Besogne—la Besogne. [337]

Oct. 8 For the attack of October 8, the 110th and 112th Infantry Regiments were under command of the 55th Infantry Brigade, and the 111th and 109th Infantry Regiments under command of the 56th Infantry Brigade. [23, 289]

On the right, the 110th Infantry attempted to advance at daybreak from its positions on the hill between Hill 223 and Cote 244, in conjunction with the 82d Division. The enemy positions in the vicinity of the crossroads west of Cote 244 prevented any advance during the morning. In compliance with instructions of the 28th Division sent at 12:45 p. m. to continue the attack with all possible dispatch to the objective, the 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry, was sent from support in the early part of the afternoon to assist the attack of the 110th Infantry by attacking between the 110th Infantry and the 82d Division. This battalion passed the front of the 110th Infantry about 2 p. m., and continued to the west, establishing a line in conjunction with the 82d Division, which had advanced during

the afternoon to the narrow-gauge railroad running north and south 2 kilometers west of Châtel-Chéhéry. The 110th Infantry and the remainder of the 112th Infantry were held in support during the night. [23, 257, 267, 289, 338]

Commencing at daybreak the 1st and 2d Battalions, 111th Infantry, also attempted to take the enemy machine guns west of Cote 244, but could not move forward from the line of the night of October 7-8. During the morning the 3d Battalion, 111th Infantry, in reserve, completed the mopping up of Bois de Taille l'Abbé. In compliance with instructions from the 28th Division sent at 12:45 p. m., similar to those sent the 55th Infantry Brigade, it was planned to attack again about 1:30 p. m., reinforcing the right with the 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry. This attack took place as ordered, but the 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, attacking from the southwest of Cote 244, could gain no ground and withdrew to its former positions. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 111th Infantry, however, were able to advance their lines to the road running southwest from the crossroads west of Cote 244, and took a position for the night generally along this road. The left was refused somewhat to maintain contact with the 77th Division, which had not advanced past its positions of the night of October 7-8. [23, 223, 267, 289, 339]

There was no front-line liaison between the 55th and 56th Infantry Brigades during the day. [267]

At 8 p. m. the I Corps issued orders directing the 163d Infantry Brigade, 82d Division, to relieve the 28th Division, less artillery and engineers, on the front it then held. The relief was to be completed before 4 a. m., October 9. The 103d Engineers and the 53d Field Artillery Brigade, 28th Division, were to pass to the command of the 82d Division at 9 p. m., October 8. The artillery subsequently moved to Belgium, where it supported the 91st Division in the Ypres-Lys Offensive, October 30-November 4 and November 10-11. [1, 340]

The 28th Division issued field orders directing that upon arrival of the 326th Infantry, 82d Division, in the positions then occupied by troops of the 28th Division, the latter would stand relieved. After being relieved, the 28th Division, less artillery

and engineers, was to move to the Charpentry—Montblainville area as reserve of the I Corps. [301]

Oct. 82d Division relieved the front-line elements of the 28th Division as ordered, completing the relief about 8:15 a. m. The time of the passage of command was not stated in the field orders regulating the relief. [256, 289]

9-10 On October 10 the division was relieved from assignment to the I Corps, assigned to the IV Corps and began to move to the vicinity of Thiaucourt as reserve of the First Army. [1]

CASUALTIES, CLERMONT SECTOR AND MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE

		Sept. 19-25	Sept. 26- Oct. 3	Oct. 4- 12	Total
<i>28th Division</i>					
109th Inf. -----	{ W -----	13	470	325	808
	{ DW -----	1	42	27	70
	{ K -----	3	99	82	184
110th Inf. -----	{ W -----	28	593	206	827
	{ DW -----		42	20	62
	{ K -----	1	149	55	205
111th Inf. -----	{ W -----	10	410	148	568
	{ DW -----		39	20	59
	{ K -----		107	84	191
112th Inf. -----	{ W -----	10	373	137	520
	{ DW -----	1	48	16	65
	{ K -----		117	48	165
107th FA. ----- (DS Oct. 9-10)	{ W -----	1	33	1	35
	{ DW -----		3		3
	{ K -----		8		8
108th FA. ----- (DS Oct. 9-10)	{ W -----	4	7	4	15
	{ DW -----	1	1	2	4
	{ K -----	3			3
109th FA. ----- (DS Oct. 9-10)	{ W -----	11	27	23	61
	{ DW -----		3	1	4
	{ K -----	1	6	3	10
107th MG Bn. -----	{ W -----		35	36	71
	{ DW -----		2	2	4
	{ K -----		4	2	6
108th MG Bn. -----	{ W -----		67	37	104
	{ DW -----		4	2	6
	{ K -----		5		5
109th MG Bn. -----	{ W -----		21	12	33
	{ DW -----		1	4	5
	{ K -----		7	1	8
103d Engrs. ----- (DS Oct. 9-10)	{ W -----	1	30	17	48
	{ DW -----		3	1	4
	{ K -----		1	7	8
Others -----	{ W -----	21	35	24	80
	{ DW -----	1	5	2	8
	{ K -----		13	2	15
Total -----		111	2, 810	1, 351	4, 272
<i>Attached Units</i>					
327th Inf. (82d Div) ----- (Sept. 29-Oct. 3)	{ W -----		87		87
	{ DW -----		7		7
	{ K -----		12		12
Total -----			106		106
Aggregate total -----		111	2, 916	1, 351	4, 378

W=wounds not mortal; DW=died of wounds; K=killed in action; DS=detached service.

Thiaucourt Sector and Woëvre Plain Operation and Subsequent Service

THIAUCOURT SECTOR AND WOËVRE PLAIN OPERATION,
OCTOBER 16—NOVEMBER 11

SUBSEQUENT SERVICE, NOVEMBER 12, 1918—MAY 1919

WHEN IT WAS DECIDED that the First Army would undertake the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, it became necessary to limit the St. Mihiel Offensive to the elimination of the salient itself. Therefore, at the conclusion of the St. Mihiel operation, the First Army established a defensive position along the general line, Pont-à-Mousson—Vandières—Jaulny—Woël—Haudiomont, while it concentrated the bulk of its forces west of the Meuse River and launched the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. This position was immediately in front of the Hindenburg Line, which, on this portion of the front, was known to the Germans as the Michel Stellung. The outposts of the Michel Stellung extended along the general line, Prény—Bois de Grand Fontaine—Rembercourt—Dampvitoux—Jonville—Harville—Etain. Since the close of the St. Mihiel Offensive on September 16, the activities of the troops on this front had been limited to the defense of their sectors and conducting demonstrations in support of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. [237, 252]

On October 12 the front of the First Army was divided. That portion of the line from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle River, to Fresnes-en-Woëvre, 18 kilometers southeast of Verdun, was placed under the command of the newly organized Second Army. The mission of the Second Army was to occupy and defend its zone, cooperate with the French Eighth Army to the east in defending the fortified areas of Frouard and Nancy, and to make preparations for eventual offensive action. Its line was approximately 45 kilometers long and, on October 15, was held by the American IV and French II Colonial Corps

from right to left. The IV Corps had the 92d, 7th and 37th Divisions in line, from right to left. [104, 237, 309, 332]



The following paragraphs, in *italic*, are a synopsis of the service of the 28th Division in the Thiaucourt Sector and the Woëvre Plain Operation. This synopsis is designed to make the principal facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact form.

On October 16 the 28th Division relieved the 37th Division as the left division of the IV Corps in the Thiaucourt Sector. To its right was the 7th Division, and to its left, the French 39th Division. The latter was withdrawn on October 29, and was replaced by the American 28th and 33d Divisions, which extended their lines to the west and east respectively. The 28th Division engaged in active patrolling until the opening of the general offensive of the Second Army on November 10.

On October 24 the division improved its position by occupying Haumont-les-Lachaussée. Following an enemy raid on the town on October 29, the garrison was withdrawn. On November 4 the front line was moved forward to the northern edge of Bois des Haudronvilles Bas.

Marimbois Ferme was seized and held during the night of November 9 in preparation for the attack of the following day. On November 10, the 111th Infantry attacked from Bois de Dommartin, which had been occupied early in the morning by the 112th Infantry, against Dommartin-la-Chaussée, but was forced back to the wood. At the same time, the 109th Infantry attacked near Haumont and advanced its line about 1 kilometer northeast of the town. The 111th Infantry advanced its line to the north edge of Bois des Haravillers.

The 55th Infantry Brigade renewed the attack on November 11 and advanced its elements across the railroad track northeast of Haumont. Further operations were halted by the Armistice.

Upon being relieved in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the 28th Division was assigned to the IV Corps, and moved to the

Oct. vicinity of Thiaucourt as reserve of the First Army. It passed
 16-23 to the Second Army on October 12, when that army assumed
 command of this part of the front. On October 16 the 28th
 Division relieved the 37th Division in the Thiaucourt Sector as
 the left division of the IV Corps. The 164th Field Artillery
 Brigade, 89th Division, which had been supporting the 37th
 Division, remained in line with the 28th Division until November
 11. Command passed to the 28th Division at 11 p. m., October
 16. The sector limits were as follows:

Right boundary: western edge of Bois de Bonvaux—point on
 unimproved road 800 meters east of Rembercourt-sur-Mad.

Left boundary: Digue, 200 meters southwest of Etang des
 Ancyennes—southwest tip of Etang de Lachaussée—
 Lachaussée (incl.).

[341, 342, 343, 344, 346]

The front line extended from a point about 1,400 meters east
 of Jaulny in Bois de Blainchamp, along the northern edges of
 Bois de Hailbat, Bois de la Montagne, Bois de Charey and Bois
 de la Grande Souche. The 7th Division was to the right, and
 the French 39th Division, French II Colonial Corps, to the left.
 [309, 342, 343, 345]

The 28th Division placed the 56th Infantry Brigade in line in
 the following formation:

<i>112th Infantry</i>		<i>111th Infantry</i>	
3d Battalion	2d Battalion	3d Battalion	2d Battalion
1st Battalion		1st Battalion	
[347, 348, 349]			

Successful raids by patrols from all front-line battalions of
 the 111th and 112th Infantry Regiments were made at 1:30
 a. m., October 22, against the practice trenches south of Mon
 Plaisir Ferme, Bois de Dommartin and an aviation park near
 Marimbois Ferme. The sector was quiet on October 23. [350,
 351, 352, 353]

The VI Corps assumed command of the 92d Division on
 October 23, thus becoming the right corps of the Second Army.
 [309]

At 5 a. m., October 24, the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, sent a detachment into Haumont-les-Lachaussée and occupied the town without opposition. [354, 355]

Oct.
24-29

On the same day the Second Army ordered the 28th and 33d Divisions to relieve the French 39th Division. The American divisions were to extend their lines to a new boundary, Hattonchâtel—le Rebois wood, which was to be effective at 8 a. m., October 29. At the same time an adjustment of the front of the IV Corps was to be made so that the 7th Division would extend westward to a boundary, Xammes—Charey (both excl.). [356, 357, 358]

From October 25 to 28 the division engaged in active patrolling, particularly in front of Bois Bonseil and Charey. Bois de Dommartin was raided frequently. [342, 359]

The reliefs ordered by the Second Army on October 24 were carried out, the 7th Division extending to the west and relieving two battalions of the 56th Infantry Brigade. The 55th Infantry Brigade extended the front of the division to the west, relieving elements of the French 39th Division in the front line and establishing contact with the 33d Division. The 55th Infantry Brigade organized its portion of the sector with the 110th Infantry in the front line and the 109th Infantry in reserve. The 134th Field Artillery, 37th Division, was attached to the 28th Division on October 28 and continued in support of the division until November 11. [23, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364]

At 2 a. m., October 29, the enemy attacked the outpost of the 112th Infantry in Haumont. The town was evacuated at 6:30 p. m. and the front line withdrawn to the northern edge of Bois de la Grande Souche. Observation posts were maintained in the town by day and it was frequently reconnoitered by patrols at night. Bois de Dommartin was again raided during the night of October 29-30. [365, 366]

On October 30 reconnaissance patrols of the 110th and 112th Infantry Regiments discovered that the enemy was occupying Bois Bonseil and Lachaussée in force and that his outposts were in the southern edge of Bois des Cerfs and in the fringe of trees along the western edge of Etang de Chaudotte. Patrols learned also that there were no permanent posts in Francheville

Oct. 30-
Nov. 1

Ferme, Ferme des Hauts Journaux, or Bois des Haravillers. [367, 368]

A mixed post was established on October 31 by the 110th Infantry and the 132d Infantry, 33d Division, in the western corner of Le Rebois wood. [369, 370]

On November 1 a day outpost was established in Ferme des Hauts Journaux. [368]

By the end of October, the First Army had accomplished the first part of its plan for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive and was ready to undertake the second operation to cut the Carignan—Sedan—Mézières railroad, and drive the enemy beyond the Meuse. An attack to accomplish this was launched on November 1. [237]

On November 1 the Second Army issued field orders covering its action in case the Germans withdrew on its front. The IV Corps issued its field orders on the following day. In case the enemy withdrew, it was anticipated that he would pivot on the Fortress of Metz, holding the outer defenses along the general line, Verny—Ancy-sur-Moselle—Amanvillers, all about 12 kilometers from the center of the city. Pivoting on its right, the Second Army was to follow closely and maintain contact with the French Eighth Army to its right, and with the First Army. On the left of the Second Army, the French II Colonial Corps was to develop any weakness in the German defenses, and hold the bulk of its troops in readiness to push the enemy's withdrawal. It was to advance in the direction of Conflans-en-Jarnisy, 13 kilometers north of Xonville, in close liaison with the right corps of the First Army, which would move on Etain. In the center, the IV Corps, pivoting on the left of the VI Corps, was to advance its left in liaison with the French II Colonial Corps. The VI Corps was to hold its lines, send out strong detachments to keep contact with the enemy and maintain liaison with the French Eighth Army. To insure cohesion in the forward movement, use was to be made of formed units from support and reserve. Special attention was to be given to the prompt assembly of troops deployed in sectors. [372, 373]

The field orders of the 28th Division for this follow-up operation were not issued until November 9. These orders directed

that the left of the division would advance in conjunction with the 33d Division. The right boundary was extended to Chambley (incl.), and the left to Latour-en-Woëvre (excl.). The objective was designated as the general line, Chambley—Mars-le-Tour, 6 kilometers northeast of Latour-en-Woëvre. The advance was to be made in two brigade columns, the 56th Infantry Brigade on the right. One regiment of 75-mm guns, one battalion of 155-mm howitzers and one company of engineers were to be attached to each brigade. [154, 393, 394]

At 4:40 a. m., November 2, the division sent a raiding party from the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, into Bois Bonseil with the object of taking prisoners and capturing and destroying enemy matériel and works. The mission was accomplished. [367, 371]

Nov.
2-6

Acting on reports received about 11 p. m., November 3, that the enemy was withdrawing along the entire front west of the Moselle River, the division at 2 a. m., November 4, ordered strong reconnaissance patrols to be pushed to the front at 5:10 a. m. to maintain contact with the enemy. These patrols were to be prepared to take up the pursuit promptly. The 1st Battalion, 111th Infantry, the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, 110th Infantry, were each ordered to send forward one company behind a barrage to reconnoiter, respectively, the enemy line between Charey and Dommartin, Bois Bonseil and Bois des Cerfs. The company of the 2d Battalion, 110th Infantry, was directed to continue through Bois des Cerfs to Bois de Noire Terre. Each company was to be supported by a battalion. These battalions were to be prepared to form an advance guard in case the reconnaissance established the fact that the enemy was withdrawing. The reconnaissances developed the information that the enemy continued to hold his lines in force. [23, 374, 375]

At 2:30 p. m., November 4, the 55th Infantry Brigade ordered the establishment of a line of outposts at Ferme des Hauts Journaux and in the northern edges of Bois des Haravillers and Bois des Haudronvilles Bas. Companies E and F, 110th Infantry, supported by a detachment from the 109th Infantry, were ordered to organize the latter wood. Company A, 110th

Infantry, was ordered to organize Bois des Haravillers and Ferme des Hauts Journaux, supported by a detachment from Company M, 109th Infantry. The outposts in the northern edge of Bois des Haudronvilles Bas were established as ordered. The force which attempted to establish the outposts at Ferme des Hauts Journaux and in the northern edge of Bois des Haravillers found the positions untenable and retired to the original lines. A day observation post, however, was maintained at Ferme des Hauts Journaux until November 10. [23, 364, 376, 377, 378]

Two patrols sent out by the 112th Infantry on November 4 raided Marimbois Ferme. [269, 321]

The sector of the 110th Infantry was extended to the right on this date to include Haumont. The relief was completed at 10:18 p. m. [377]

At 6 p. m. the 28th Division ordered a raid by the 55th Infantry Brigade on Bois des Cerfs to be made on November 5. The raiding party was to assemble by 4 a. m., November 5, in Ferme des Hauts Journaux and at 5:15 a. m. advance north-east generally parallel to the railroad to the fork in the wood, where it was to deploy and comb the wood south, returning to the outpost position in the northern edge of Bois des Haudronvilles Bas. The raiding party was furnished by the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry. The troops came under enemy artillery fire near the roadfork in the east central portion of Bois des Haravillers and did not carry out their mission. [23, 377, 379, 380]

At 10 p. m., November 5, the division ordered a raid to be made at 5:15 a. m., November 7, by troops of the 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, under instructions similar to those covering the attempt of November 5. [381]

In the meantime, the attack of the First Army had been highly successful. By November 5, it had broken through the enemy's defenses and artillery positions west of the Meuse and was pursuing rapidly toward Sedan. Elements of the First Army had also forced a crossing of the river and established a bridgehead at Dun-sur-Meuse. [237]

The French XVII Corps relieved the French II Colonial Corps as the left corps of the Second Army on November 6. [309, 398, 399]

In view of reports that the enemy was making preparations to withdraw, the Second Army issued field orders on November 6 which directed that the situation would be developed on D-day by a reconnaissance in force. A limited portion of the Michel Stellung was to be seized and, should any weakness on the part of the enemy be developed, the movement was to be exploited to the fullest extent. The principal mission was assigned to the IV Corps. It was to employ two brigades of infantry, one from the 7th Division and one from the 28th Division, to attack in the direction of Waville, 3 kilometers east of St. Julien-les-Gorze, and gain the general line, northeastern edge of Bois de Grand Fontaine—north end of spur east of Rembercourt-sur-Mad—northern edge of Bois de la Perrière—Grande Fontaine. Part of the artillery of the VI and French XVII Corps was to support the movement upon the request of the IV Corps. In addition, the corps to the flanks were to fire artillery demonstrations and conduct raids on their respective fronts. [382, 383, 384]

Pursuant to these orders of the Second Army, the IV Corps and the 28th Division issued field orders for the reconnaissance *Nov. 7* in force on November 7. A provisional brigade, to be composed of the 109th Infantry, 111th Infantry, 107th Machine-Gun Battalion and one company of the 103d Engineers, was designated to make the attack. This brigade was to pass through the lines of the 7th Division west of Le Rupt de Mad Ruisseau, and attack in conjunction with a brigade of the 7th Division which was to advance east of the stream. The objective was the line, north edge of Bois de la Perrière—Charey (excl.)—Grande Fontaine. Upon reaching this objective, strong reconnaissance detachments were to be pushed to St. Julien-les-Gorze and Dommartin-la-Chaussée. The remainder of the 28th Division was to be prepared to advance on receipt of orders. [387, 388, 389]

A patrol sent through Marimbois Ferme at 2:45 a. m., November 7, developed the information that the enemy had not re-occupied the farm but that he was still holding Bois de Dommartin. [385]

Pursuant to the division order issued on November 5, a raid-

ing party from the 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, was sent from the northern edge of Bois des Haravillers at 5:15 a. m. to raid Bois des Cerfs and capture prisoners. The party, preceded by a barrage, cleared the wood of the enemy and obtained prisoners. [386]

Nov. There was active patrolling on November 8 and 9. Several
8-9 outpost positions were advanced on these dates. During the night of the 8th-9th, a platoon of the 112th Infantry and a platoon of Company A, 109th Machine-Gun Battalion, occupied Marimbois Ferme. They were joined on the following afternoon by elements of the 107th Machine-Gun Battalion. [23, 390]

At 11 p. m., November 8, the 55th Infantry Brigade ordered a raid on Bois des Cerfs to be executed at 5:30 a. m., November 9, by the 110th Infantry, for the purpose of determining whether the enemy was still holding his positions. The raiding party, taken from the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry, found the enemy front-line positions in Bois des Cerfs strongly held. At the same hour a raiding party was sent from Ferme de Champ Fontaine toward Bois Bonseil. In the late afternoon of the 9th, the 110th Infantry reoccupied Haumont with an outpost of one platoon of Company H, but withdrew the post at night. [390, 391, 392]

At 5:45 p. m. the Second Army issued field orders designating November 11 as D-day for the reconnaissance in force covered by its orders of the 6th. At 6:30 p. m., having received reports that the enemy was withdrawing, it issued field orders directing that the follow-up operation, covered by its orders of the 1st, be initiated at once. The instructions to the IV Corps were modified so that the corps, in advancing its center, could take advantage of preparations which had already been made to carry out the orders of the 6th. [395, 396, 397]

By November 9 the enemy was in full retreat along the entire front of the Allied offensives. On this day the Allied Commander-in-Chief issued instructions to the Commanders-in-Chief to push their attacks vigorously. These instructions were transmitted by the American Commander-in-Chief to the First and Second Armies. Those for the Second Army were contained in a telegram received at 8:55 p. m. which directed

that the enemy be pushed with all energy and decisive results obtained. Verbal orders were given to all corps commanders between 9 p. m. and 11 p. m., which were confirmed by field orders issued at 1:30 a. m., November 10. The result of these orders was to commit the Second Army to a general offensive instead of an attack of limited objectives.³ [237, 384]

The attack was to be launched at 7 a. m., November 10. On the left, the French XVII Corps was to advance northeast in the direction of Conflans. In the center, the IV Corps was to move on Vionville, 9 kilometers east of Latour-en-Woëvre. The VI Corps was to push northward on both banks of the Moselle River. The right boundary of the 28th Division was extended to Vionville (incl.), and the left to Jarny (excl.), 6 kilometers northeast of Latour-en-Woëvre. [396, 402]

The attack was not launched at 7 a. m. as planned. However, both brigades sent out raiding parties during the morning which established the fact that the enemy was covering his withdrawal by a strong rear guard. [23] Nov. 10

The 56th Infantry Brigade ordered a raid made on Dommartin. The 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, was designated as the raiding force and, moving forward before dawn into Bois de Dommartin, launched its attack from that wood about 5:30 a. m. The raiding party advanced to the enemy wire where it came under artillery fire and was compelled to retire to Bois de Dommartin. The 112th Infantry was relieved in the wood by the 111th Infantry. [23, 403, 417]

In the zone of action of the 55th Infantry Brigade, the 110th Infantry reoccupied Haumont in preparation for an attack through the town by the 109th Infantry. [23, 401]

The 55th Infantry Brigade received verbal orders at 8:30 a. m. for an attack by the 109th Infantry to be launched at 1 p. m. from Haumont against the enemy line between Bois Bonseil and Lachaussée in conjunction with an attack by the 56th Infantry Brigade against Dommartin. The hour of attack

³ All of the service of the Second Army has been officially classified by the War Department as sector service. However, the offensive action of November 10-11 is often referred to as the Woëvre Plain Operation.

was later postponed to 2:30 p. m. in order to provide sufficient time to complete the necessary arrangements. [401]

At 12:45 p. m. the order of battle of the division was as follows:

<i>55TH INFANTRY BRIGADE</i>		<i>56TH INFANTRY BRIGADE</i>
<i>110th Infantry</i>	<i>109th Infantry</i>	<i>111th Infantry</i>
3d Battalion	2d Battalion	1st Battalion
2d Battalion	1st Battalion	<i>3d Battalion, 112th Infantry</i>
1st Battalion	3d Battalion	2d Battalion
		3d Battalion

DIVISION RESERVE

1st Battalion, 112th Infantry
2d Battalion, 112th Infantry

The 112th Infantry was holding the front of the 56th Infantry Brigade with one battalion, and had been instructed to maintain liaison with the 7th Division. One battalion of the 111th Infantry was in Bois de Dommartin, prepared to attack with a second battalion in support in Bois de Charey and a third battalion near Bény. The 109th Infantry was near Haumont, echeloned in depth, and prepared to attack. The 110th Infantry extended from Le Séjour Bois to the west boundary of the division. Elements of Company A, 109th Machine-Gun Battalion, and Companies A and B, 107th Machine-Gun Battalion, were at Marimbois Ferme. [23, 404, 405]

The artillery preparation, south of Dommartin and on the line, Bois Bonseil—Lachaussée, began at 2:30 p. m. [401]

The 1st Battalion, 111th Infantry, attacked at 3:30 p. m. against Dommartin, but was forced by an enemy counterattack to retire to Bois de Dommartin, where it was supported by the 2d Battalion. The regiment continued to hold the wood throughout the night. Elements of the 111th Infantry were placed with the machine-gun units at Marimbois Ferme. [23, 405, 406, 407]

The 109th Infantry advanced its 2d Battalion, with the 1st Battalion in support, northeast through Haumont. The attack made little progress on account of the intensity of the enemy fire and the flooded condition of the low ground between

Haumont and Bois Bonseil. The 2d Battalion moved forward in column of companies and, passing through the enemy wire between Haumont and Ruisseau d'Yron, deployed along the narrow-gauge railroad. The 1st Battalion advanced to a position to the right of the 2d Battalion. The 3d Battalion maintained a position in regimental reserve. Neither of the front-line battalions was able to discover a fording place. Some of the troops were withdrawn for the night to Bois de la Grande Souche. Outposts continued to hold the position along the railroad throughout the night. [23, 405, 406, 408, 409]

On the extreme left, elements of the 110th Infantry gained and organized the line, northwest corner Bois des Haudronvilles Bas—north edge of Bois des Haravillers. [410, 411]

The 110th Infantry was ordered to be prepared to attack through Bois des Cerfs in conjunction with an attack by the 33d Division to its left. However, except for the elements on the extreme left, the regiment did not move forward. [23, 401]

At 2:50 p. m. the Second Army ordered the IV Corps to break through the line, Charey—Lachaussée. At 8 p. m. the corps ordered the 7th and 28th Divisions to concentrate their efforts where weaknesses had developed and make heavy attacks on restricted fronts for the purpose of breaking through and rendering exploitation possible. [412, 413]

Late in the day the division ordered strong reconnaissances along the front to locate any weaknesses in the enemy line. [414]

At 12:20 a. m., November 11, the division directed the resumption of the attack at 5:45 a. m. The attack was to be made by the 55th Infantry Brigade, which was to seize and hold the system of enemy trenches near Bois Bonseil. After taking this position, the brigade was to extend to the flanks, capture Dampvitoux and Lachaussée, and move to Hadonville-les-Lachaussée, where a defensive position was to be seized and held. The 56th Infantry Brigade, less elements in front-line positions, was to remain in reserve near St. Benoit-en-Woëvre. [415]

Nov. 11

The flooded condition of the low ground paralleling the narrow-gauge railroad track northeast of Haumont having

abated during the morning, the 109th Infantry passed a few men across shallow places under cover of fog. As visibility improved, the enemy laid heavy fire upon the advancing troops, checking further progress. At 11 a. m. these troops were on a line east of the railroad and west of Bois Bonseil. [23, 411, 414, 416]

Elements of the 56th Infantry Brigade in the front line continued to hold their positions. Patrols from the right flank established themselves on the Xammes—Charey road about 500 meters in advance of the outpost line. [23, 400, 406]

Hostilities were brought to a close by the Armistice at 11 a. m. [406]

Nov. 12,
1918-
May 1919

Subsequent to the Armistice the 28th Division moved on January 6, 1919, to the 6th (Colombey-les-Belles) Training Area. On March 12, the 103d Trench-Mortar Battery sailed from Brest. On March 16, the division was assembled at the American Embarkation Center, Le Mans. The leading elements sailed from St. Nazaire on April 16. The last units arrived in New York on May 22. [1]

CASUALTIES, THIAUCOURT SECTOR AND WOËVRE PLAIN
OPERATION

		Oct. 13- Nov. 8	Nov. 9-11	Total
<i>28th Division</i>				
109th Inf.....	W.....	32	131	163
	DW.....		6	6
	K.....	5	11	16
110th Inf.....	W.....	39	28	67
	DW.....	2	4	6
	K.....	4	8	12
111th Inf.....	W.....	181	70	251
	DW.....	17	3	20
	K.....	56	4	60
112th Inf.....	W.....	247	12	259
	DW.....	8	1	9
	K.....	23		23
107th MG Bn.....	W.....	7	23	30
	DW.....			
	K.....	1		1
108th MG Bn.....	W.....	18	9	27
	DW.....			
	K.....	6	1	7
109th MG Bn.....	W.....	67	6	73
	DW.....	6	2	8
	K.....	2		2
103d Engrs.....	W.....	16	3	19
	DW.....	1		1
	K.....	1		1
Others.....	W.....	18	2	20
	DW.....	1		1
	K.....			
Total.....		758	324	1,082
<i>Attached Units</i>				
340th FA (89th Div) (Oct. 16-Nov. 11).....	W.....	34	1	35
	DW.....	1		1
	K.....	6		6
341st FA (89th Div) (Oct. 16-Nov. 11).....	W.....	5	23	28
	DW.....			
	K.....			
342d FA (89th Div) (Oct. 16-Nov. 11).....	W.....	27		27
	DW.....			
	K.....			
134th FA (37th Div) (Oct. 28-Nov. 11).....	W.....	1		1
	DW.....			
	K.....			
314th Am Tn (89th Div) (Oct. 16-Nov. 11).....	W.....	11	2	13
	DW.....	3		3
	K.....	1		1
Total.....		89	26	115
Aggregate total.....		847	350	1,197

W=wounds not mortal; DW=died of wounds; K=killed in action.

Appendix

INFANTRY DIVISION (COMBAT) ORGANIZATION IN EFFECT NOVEMBER 11, 1918

Units	Number of units	Strength
Division Headquarters.....	1	304
Infantry Brigades.....	2	25
Brigade Headquarters ¹	(2)	(50)
Infantry Regiment ¹	2	6
Regimental Headquarters ²	(4)	(24)
Headquarters Company ²	1	343
Machine-Gun Company ²	(4)	(1, 372)
Supply Company ²	1	178
Infantry Battalions ²	(4)	(712)
Battalion Headquarters ²	1	162
Rifle Companies ²	(4)	(648)
Machine-Gun Battalions ¹	3	3
Medical Department and Chaplains ¹	(12)	(36)
Ordnance Department ¹	1	3, 072
Veterinary Field Units ¹	(48)	(12, 288)
Field Artillery Brigade.....	1	759
Brigade Headquarters.....	(2)	(1, 518)
Regiments, 75-mm Gun.....	1	127
Regiments, 155-mm Howitzer.....	1	(254)
Trench-Mortar Battery.....	1	20
Medical Department and Chaplains.....	1	(40)
Ordnance Department.....	1	4
Veterinary Field Units.....	(2)	(8)
Machine-Gun Battalion.....	1	79
Battalion Headquarters.....	1	3, 036
Machine-Gun Companies.....	2	1, 616
Medical Department.....	1	177
Ordnance Department.....	1	96
Veterinary Field Units.....	4	49
Engineer Regiment.....	1	16
Battalion Headquarters.....	1	30
Machine-Gun Companies.....	2	356
Medical Department.....	1	7
Ordnance Department.....	1	2
Field Signal Battalion.....	1	1, 712
Medical Department and Chaplains.....	1	31
Ordnance Department.....	1	6
Trains.....	1	488
Total.....	28, 105	28, 105

¹ Upper figures indicate number per brigade.

² Upper figures indicate number per regiment.

³ Upper figures indicate number per battalion.

Figures in parentheses indicate number per division.

Figures in parentheses indicate number per division.

Figures in parentheses indicate number per division.

STRENGTH OF 28TH DIVISION ¹

Units	June 30	July 31	Aug. 31	Sept. 30	Oct. 31	Nov. 30
109th Inf.....	3,462	3,176	2,603	2,324	1,861	3,035
110th Inf.....	3,382	2,337	2,077	1,600	2,576	3,065
111th Inf.....	3,512	3,163	2,388	3,414	3,408	2,909
112th Inf.....	3,563	3,205	2,681	2,874	2,659	2,978
107th MG Bn.....	374	368	360	364	316	322
108th MG Bn.....	720	722	634	609	683	675
109th MG Bn.....	701	680	577	591	735	660
Total Inf and MG ².....	15,758	13,700	11,356	11,819	12,282	13,681
107th FA.....	1,316	1,353	1,385	1,284	1,194	1,174
108th FA.....	1,399	1,409	1,679	1,655	1,627	1,621
109th FA.....	1,307	1,320	1,373	1,372	1,288	1,334
Total FA ³.....	4,249	4,308	4,660	4,503	4,351	4,355
103d Engrs.....	1,585	1,434	1,452	1,455	1,471	1,485
Others.....	2,631	3,023	3,735	4,232	4,071	3,938
Total.....	24,223	22,465	21,203	22,009	22,175	23,459

¹ Present with the units of the division; does not include absentees.

² Includes both infantry brigade headquarters.

³ Includes field artillery brigade headquarters and the 103d Trench-Mortar Battery.

GENERAL TABLE OF CASUALTIES

	28th Division	Attached units	Total
Château-Thierry Sector, Champagne-Marne Defensive, Aisne-Marne Offensive, Fismes Sector and Oise-Aisne Offensive.....	8,623	149	8,772
Clermont Sector and Meuse-Argonne Offensive.....	4,272	106	4,378
Thiaucourt Sector and Woëvre Plain Operation.....	1,082	115	1,197

Sources

The following is a list of the sources on which the statements made in the preceding narrative are based. The numbers refer to the corresponding numbers in brackets at the ends of paragraphs.

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- 2 Table of Organization, G. H. Q., A. E. F., Dec. 1.
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- 4 "My Experiences in the World War", Pershing.
- 5 Rapport du Maréchal Commandant-en-Chef des Armées Françaises du Nord et du Nord-est sur les Opérations en 1918.
- 6 Letter of Instructions, Chief of Staff, A. E. F., to 4th and 28th Divisions, June 11.
- 7 War Diary, 28th Division, June 13.
- 8 Report of Operations, 28th Division, June 12—Aug. 4.
- 9 Special Order No. 3325, French Sixth Army, June 22.
- 10 Daily Operations Report No. 1488/3, French XXXVIII Corps, June 28.
- 11 Operations Memorandum No. 1519/3, French Sixth Army, June 24.
- 12 Field Orders No. 3, 28th Division, June 27.
- 13 War Diary, 55th Infantry Brigade, June 28—30.
- 14 General Operations Order No. 143, French XXXVIII Corps, July 1.
- 15 Field Orders No. 5, 55th Infantry Brigade, July 3.
- 16 Report of Operations, 55th Infantry Brigade, July 15—31.
- 17 Journal, French XXXVIII Corps, July 8.
- 18 War Diary, 109th Infantry, July 9.
- 19 War Diary, 55th Infantry Brigade, July 9 and 11.
- 20 General Operations Order No. 288/OP, French 125th Division, July 12.
- 21 War Diary, 110th Infantry, July 10.
- 22 Report of Operations, Company L, 109th Infantry, July 14—18.
- 23 Special Correspondence, American Battle Monuments Commission. This pertains to information in the files of the Commission which was obtained in the manner indicated in the preface.
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- 35 Daily Operations Report No. 1293/PC, French 39th Division, July 10.
- 36 Report of Operations, 111th Infantry, June 29-July 18.
- 37 Report of Operations, Company G, 112th Infantry, July 8-9.
- 38 Telegram No. 444-6/M, 3d Bureau, French Armies of the North and Northeast, July 7.
- 39 Memorandum No. 9076/2, French Armies of the North and Northeast, July 11.
- 40 Letter No. 1439, Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies, June 14.
- 41 Instruction No. 14546, French Armies of the North and Northeast, July 12.
- 42 Letter No. 2053, Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies, July 13.
- 43 Order No. 844, Ia, German Seventh Army, June 25.
- 44 Order No. 941, Ia, German Seventh Army, July 5.
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- 47 Kriegstagebuch, German Seventh Army, July 15.
- 48 Report of Operations, Company M, 109th Infantry, July 14-18.
- 49 Report of Operations, Company B, 110th Infantry, July 15.
- 50 Report of Operations, 56th Infantry Brigade, July 15-31.
- 51 Journal, French Sixth Army, July 15.
- 52 Report of Operations, 109th Infantry, July 22.
- 53 Field Notes, Historical Section, General Staff, A. E. F.
- 54 Kriegstagebuch, German 201st Division, July 1-3.
- 55 Daily Operations Report, French 125th Division, July 15.
- 56 Daily Operations Report, French 73d Division, July 15.
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- 58 Report of Operations, French 73d Division, July 15-25.
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- 60 Report of Operations, Company M, 38th Infantry, July 15-21.
- 61 Kriegstagebuch, German Seventh Army, July 16.
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- 65 Daily Operations Report No. 809/3, French 20th Division, July 16.
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